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I. Introduction
The concept of "monopoly power"' is crucial to several antitrust
causes of action, 2 most notably the completed and attempted monop-
olization offenses under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.' The com-
I. The term "monopoly power" refers to the ability of a firm to control price or ex-
clude competition. See infra notes 22-32 and accompanying text. Some commentators use the
terms monopoly power and market power interchangeably. E.g., Stein & Brett, Market Defini-
tions and Market Power in Antitrust Cases - An Empirical Primer on When, Why and How,
24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv, 639, 642 n.10 (1979). This article, however, adopts the convention of
using the term monopoly power to refer not to mere market power, but to "substantial" mar-
ket power. E.g., Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REv. 937,
937 (1981); see also infra notes 22-26 and accompanying text (explaining the distinction be-
tween market power and monopoly power).
2. In addition to the monopolization offenses under Section 2 of the Sherman Act
discussed in this article, the issue of monopoly power may arise under section 7 of the Clayton
Act which governs mergers and other transactions the effect of which may be to "substantially
...lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982). With respect to trade monopolies, the Sherman Act pro-
vides that: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade of commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony ....
Id. at § 2. The Act thus creates three offenses: monopolization, attempt to monopolize, and
pleted monopolization offense proscribes the willful acquisition or
maintenance of monopoly power in a relevant market." The at-
tempted monopolization offense makes illegal certain overt acts
which create a dangerous probability of monopolization.5 To succeed
under either cause of action, some sort of market analysis clearly is
required.
There is, however, no exact means of determining when a firm
possesses, or comes dangerously close to possessing, monopoly power.
In the context of the completed monopolization offense, many courts
focus on market share as the primary determinant of market power6
and apparently view a share approaching seventy percent as a pre-
requisite for a finding of monopolization. 7 Other courts place consid-
erable emphasis on structural evidence of monopoly power 8 and sug-
gest that even when market share falls below fifty percent,
appropriate barrier to entry or other evidence may support a finding
of monopolization."
The market analysis to be employed in attempt cases is simi-
larly unsettled. Some courts apparently look to monopolization cases
for guidance and define a dangerous possibility of monopoly power in
terms of a proximately reduced market share. 10 Other courts have
attempted to expand the application of Section 2, particularly in ver-
tical cases. These courts have either adopted narrow market defini-
tions which have the effect of overstating the defendants' market
share," or eroded altogether the need to prove a dangerous
probability of attaining monopoly power.'2
This article examines the apparently contradictory precedents
concerning monopoly power in Sherman Act Section 2 litigation.
The article reviews the concept of monopoly power in completed'"
and attempted" monopolization cases, considering case law which
either supports' 5 or refutes16 the view that a market share approach-
conspiracy to monopolize. Id. The issue of monopoly power, however, generally arises only in
completed and attempted monopolization cases. The offense of conspiracy to monopolize is
directed solely at concerted action among independent entities acting with the intent to achieve
monopoly power; neither a showing of the existence of monopoly power, nor the probability of
achieving such power, is an essential element of the offense. See, e.g., United States v. Consoli-
dated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 573 (2d Cir. 1961).
4. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 79-105 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 47-68 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 106-35 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
II. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 21-135 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 136-56 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 79-105 and accompanying text.
ing seventy percent is a prerequisite for a finding of monopolization.
The article then evaluates economic studies purporting to demon-
strate the interrelationship between market share, market structure,
and the power to control price.17 The article concludes by analyzing
the legal and economic evidence presented"8 and by suggesting
guidelines for determining when a firm possesses,19 or comes danger-
ously close to possessing,2" monopoly power.
II. The Legal Context of the Monopolization Offenses
A. The Completed Monopolization Offense
1. Monopolization Defined.-The elements of the completed
monopolization offense are well settled. A plaintiff must demonstrate
the possession of monopoly power in a relevant market, and the will-
ful acquisition or maintenance of that power, as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, busi-
ness acumen, or historic accident.2 ' Monopoly power thus is a neces-
sary but not sufficient condition for a finding of monopolization.
2. Monopoly Power Defined.-The legal definition of monop-
oly power is relatively straightforward. Monopoly power is "the
power to control price or exclude competition. ' 2 The simplicity of
the legal definition, however, belies the complexity of the underlying
economic concepts involved. Monopoly power, or the ability to "con-
trol" price, must be distinguished from market power, or the ability
merely to raise price above the competitive level.23 In order to "con-
trol" price, an alleged monopolist must possess the unilateral ability
to raise prices over the long term. Thus, the monopolist must possess
not just market power, but "substantial" market power. 24 Lower de-
grees of market power resulting from the joint efforts of several
firms,25 or from short term lags in the competitive responses of other
16. See infra notes 106-35 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 157-243 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 246-82 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 284-300 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 301-316 and accompanying text.
21. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Amer., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
22. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 105 S. Ct. 2847, 2854 n.19
(1985); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966); United States v. E.I. Du-
Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 389 (1956).
23. Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 937; 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST
LAWS 501, at 322 (1978).
24. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 23, 801, at 290 (1978). Some authors,
confusing the concepts of market power and monopoly power, use the terms interchangeably.
See Stein & Brett, supra note 1, at 642 n.10.
25. Dimmitt Agri Indus., Inc. v. CPC Intern., Inc., 679 F.2d 516, 531 (5th Cir. 1982);
3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 23, 813, at 300-02.
buyers or producers,26 are not the subject of the completed monopoli-
zation offense.
Defining monopoly in terms of a "substantial" degree of market
power necessarily leads one to consider more closely the definition of
market power. "Market power", in the economic sense, is principally
a function of three different values: the defendant's market share,
the elasticity of demand in the entire market, and the cross-elasticity
of supply of competing or potentially competing firms.2 7 As a mea-
sure of market power, courts generally have focused only on the first
of these factors - the defendant's share of the relevant market.28 It
is important to recognize, however, that both supply and demand
elasticities may affect the ability of a firm to control price as well.
Elasticity of demand is a measure of the responsiveness of the
amount of goods demanded to changes in the price of the goods or
service.29 Demand is considered elastic if a small change in price
causes a large change in quantity demanded.30 When demand is
elastic, a firm may not have the power to control price, even when its
market share is high, because even a small increase in price may
cause large numbers of consumers to "substitute away" and buy an-
other product.
3 1
Similarly, the elasticity of supply in a market may inhibit the
ability of a firm with a large market share to control price. Elasticity
of supply measures the unused capacity in an industry, or the exis-
tence of firms that could easily shift to production of the product in
question. 32 When elasticity of supply is high, attempts by dominant
firms to control price by limiting output may be curtailed, because
smaller competitors will have both the incentive and ability to en-
large their production.33
3. Proving Monopoly Power.
a. The Market Share Test.-Describing market power as a
function of supply and demand elasticities is of little use in the
26. Dimmitt Agri Indus., Inc. v. CPC Intern., Inc., 679 F.2d 516, 530 (5th Cir. 1982);
2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 23, 505, at 328.
27. Landes & Posner, supra note I, at 945-47.
28. See infra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
29. Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 940 n.8. Factors determining elasticity of de-
mand include the availability of close substitutes for the goods or services, the number and
variety of uses to which the good or service can be put, and the price of the good or service
relative to the buyer's income. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 23, 519a, at 349.
30. See supra note 29.
31. Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 945.
32. Id. Elasticity of supply can be defined as "the percentage increase in quantity sup-
plied in response to a one percent change in price." Id. at 944 n.17; see also W. NICHOLSON,
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 297 (1978). For example, if firm A's competitors are producing at
only 50% of capacity because the price of the goods produced is low, the elasticity of supply in
the industry is high.
33. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 23, 1 519b, at 349-50.
courtroom unless empirical evidence of such elasticities is both avail-
able and comprehensible. As a general rule it is not.34 Consequently,
market share percentages have become the primary measure of a
defendant's market power.35 This is consistent with the intuitive no-
tion that a firm with a very large market share, other things being
equal, has a greater ability to control price than a firm whose market
share is very small.3 6 Moreover, the intuitive relationship between
market power and market share can be demonstrated mathemati-
cally.37 Today, the law recognizes that market share alone does not
determine market power, '38 although "the correlation between mar-
ket power and market share permits courts to use market share as a
limited proxy or surrogate for market power."39
The degree to which courts will rely on market share is illus-
trated by the oft-quoted dictum in United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America (Alcoa)"' that a ninety percent share "is enough to con-
stitute a monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent
would be enough; and certainly thirty-three percent is not.' More-
34. See. e.g., Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel Serv., 651 F.2d 122, 128-29
(2d Cir. 1981) ("Formulas can express the pertinent relationships between market power,
market share, and demand and supply elasticities, but the data required for sophisticated anal-
ysis of a particular market are not always available, and their comprehension by jurors is
uncertain at best."); E. SULLIVAN & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW POLICY & PROCEDURE
432 (1984); 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 23, 1 520, at 350 ("Output figures [i.e.
market shares] are more readily obtainable and less ambiguous than capacity [i.e. supply and
demand elasticity] figures"). Despite the difficulties, some researchers have included demand
elasticity proxy variables in their regression equations. See infra note 17.1 (discussing one pos-
sible measure of demand elasticity).
35. L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST § 22, at 75 (1977) (The share of the relevant market
enjoyed by a defendant has "been conceded paramount importance" in determining market
power); see infra notes 40-44, 79-105 and accompanying text.
36. See E. SULLIVAN & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, at 432. Only when a firm is
overwhelmingly large might we expect it to be able to "control" price; when firms are small
and the market is competitive, no firm is large enough to affect prices by varying output. "To
use a time-worn example, neither the total withdrawal nor the doubling of the output of a
single small wheat farmer would noticeably affect the total supply of wheat or, consequently,
the market price established by the interaction of supply and demand." 2 P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, supra note 23, V 501, at 322.
37. See Landes & Posner, supra note I, at 944-48; cf. Schmalensee, Another Look at
Market Power, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1789 (1982); Kaplow, The Accuracy of Traditional Market
Power Analysis and a Direct Adjustment Alternative, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1817 (1982).
38. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text (discussing supply and demand elas-
ticities); Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 947; see also Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu
Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919, (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 921 (1980) (for purposes of
determining whether monopoly power exists, market share is evidence from which existence of
monopoly power may be inferred, but it should not be equated with monopoly power).
39. E. SULLIVAN & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, at 433.
40. 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945). In Alcoa, the government appealed to the Su-
preme Court, but the Court was unable to obtain a quorum because four Justices had been
associated with earlier related litigation. As a result, the case was heard by a three-member
panel of circuit court judges, with Learned Hand presiding. Id. Judge Hand's Alcoa opinion
has been cited by the Supreme Court as being tantamount to a Supreme Court decision. See
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811-14 (1946).
41. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 424.
over, in United States v. Grinnell Corp.,42 the Supreme Court held
that monopoly power "ordinarily may be inferred from the predomi-
nant share of the market," so that an eighty-seven percent market
share "leaves no doubt that ...these defendants have monopoly
power.' 43 These and subsequent cases suggest that when market
share is sufficiently high, in excess of approximately seventy-five per-
cent, monopoly power may be inferred from proof of defendant's
market share." The inference, however, does not have to be drawn
automatically, and other evidence 45 may be used to show that mo-
nopoly power does not exist despite a large market share."
b. Market Share Plus Other Factors.-In an attempt to ex-
pand the application of Section 2 to cover cases in which defendants
possess less than seventy-five percent of the relevant market, a num-
ber of commentators have theorized that monopoly power should be
provable by means other than market share alone.47 These commen-
tators suggest that market structure evidence,' 8 as well as evidence
of a defendant firm's conduct" or economic performance, 50 may sup-
port the inference of monopoly power.
(1) Market Structure.-The structure of a market is char-
acterized by a host of factors, including the size and distribution of
competing firms, the degree of product differentiation, the presence
of barriers to entry, and the extent of vertical integration.51
(a) Barriers to Entry.-Many commentators consider
barriers to entry to be a crucial factor influencing the ability of firms
to control price or exclude competition.52 These commentators define
a "barrier to entry" as anything which prevents entry into a market
42. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
43. Id. at 571.
44. E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS § 12.6, at 356 (1980); see also infra notes
79-80 (listing Supreme Court cases).
45. For a discussion of supply and demand elasticity and other evidence which might
be used to rebut the inference of monopoly power, see infra notes 51-76 and accompanying
text.
46. See S. OPPENHEIM. G. WESTON & J. MCCARTHY, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 302
(1981) [hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST LAWS]; Note, The Development of the Sherman Act
Section 2 Market Share Test and Its Inapplicability to Dynamic Markets, 49 S. CAL. L. REV.
154 (1975).
47. E.g., E. KINTNER, supra note 44, § 12.7, at 357-58; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 35, at
ch. 2c; Stein & Brett, supra note 1, at 672; see also infra notes 106-35 and accompanying text
(discussing case law which focuses on market structure as well as market share evidence).
48. See infra notes 51-67 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 74-75.
51. F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 4
(1980).
52. Id.; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 35, § 23, at 77; see generally J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO
NEW COMPETITION (1956).
from being perfectly free.53 For example, in United States v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp.,54 although the defendant possessed an over-
whelming market share, 55 the court did not predicate its finding of
monopoly power on market share alone. Rather, the court identified
several barriers to entry which, together with evidence of high mar-
ket share, suggested the presence of monopoly power. 5' Focusing on
United's accumulation of patents covering virtually every phase of
the shoe manufacturing process,57 the court found that competitors
in the shoe industry were forced to suffer significant cost disadvan-
tages by either inventing around the United patents, or purchasing
expensive licenses.5 8 Thus, United's ability to control prices could be
inferred both from its large share of the market, and from the pres-
ence of barriers to entry which made it difficult for others to enter
the market and to undercut United's prices.59 In addition to patent
advantages ° or comparable natural advantages (like prime ore
sources), 61 a number of other things have been identified as barriers
to entry, including capital cost requirements, 2 vertical integration,"
advertising,"4 and economies of scale.
65
(b) The Size and Distribution of Competitors.-The size
and distribution of competitors is another important structural con-
53. M. WATERSON, ECONOMIC THEORY OF THE INDUSTRY 57 (1984). But see infra
notes 269-282 and accompanying text (emphasizing that entry barriers as ordinarily defined
are the product of efficiencies and ought not to be the subject of antitrust concern).
54. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
55. United Shoe controlled seventy-five percent of the relevant shoe machinery market.
Id. at 297.
56. Id. at 312-33.
57. Id. at 332-33.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 314-25.
60. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 23, 1 409c, at 300.
61. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 35, § 23, at 77; 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra
note 23, 409f, at 305.
62. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 23, T 409e, at 303. But see infra note
271 and accompanying text (presenting the argument that capital costs and other entry barri-
ers result from efficiency and as such ought not to be condemned).
63. A vertically integrated defendant may be more likely to have market power, partic-
ularly where such integration is shown to have been available or employed as leverage from
one market to another. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 174 (1948);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Amer., 91 F. Supp. 881, 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
64. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 23, $ 409d, at 302; F. SCHERER, supra
note 51, at 381-84, 391-95; M. WATERSON, supra note 53, at 128-41.
65. The argument that scale economies constitute a barrier to entry runs as follows.
Suppose that economies of scale are such that the most efficient plant size is capable of pro-
ducing 55% of the market requirement, and that a firm of that size already exists. New en-
trants must begin with a market share of less than 55%, and thus face significant cost disad-
vantages. These cost disadvantages act as a "barrier" to the new entrant's ability to compete
with the larger company. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 35, § 23, at 78; J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO
NEW COMPETITION (1956). But see infra notes 272-73 and accompanying text (presenting the
argument that economies of scale result from efficiency, and as such ought not to be
condemned).
sideration. A firm with a sixty percent market share will more likely
have greater control over price if the remainder of the market is
fragmented than if there are other firms with substantial market
shares.06 Indeed, what may be critical for a finding of monopoly
power is not that the dominant firm has a particular market share,
but that each competitor has a small share. 7 When the remaining
firms are small, the fringe firms will have little incentive to engage in
strategic behavior, and thus are more likely to be price takers.68
(2) Conduct Analysis.-Commentators also suggest that a
firm's behavior or conduct may serve as direct evidence of the exis-
tence of monopoly power.6 9 The ability to control prices may be sup-
ported by evidence of remarkably high or low prices or frequent
price changes, 70 or by the ability to price so as to yield higher prices
or profits in the allegedly monopolized market as opposed to other
geographic markets in which the defendant does business." The abil-
ity to exclude competition can be supported by evidence of the loss
of competitors through attrition, 72 or by evidence of the absence of
competition where it was expected. 3
(3) Performance Analysis.-Because the ability to control
prices or exclude competition can be expected to result in increased
profits, some commentators argue that evidence of unreasonably high
profits may be introduced as circumstantial evidence that a firm pos-
sesses monopoly power. 74 The difficulty of establishing and compar-
ing profits, however, cannot be ignored, since cost allocations, accru-
als, and expenditures of questionable necessity may distort profit
computations.70 Moreover, for high profits to suggest the presence of
66. United States v. Besser Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp. 304, 307 (E.D. Mich. 1951) aff'd,
343 U.S. 444 (1952); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 795-96 (1946);
L. SULLIVAN, supra note 35, § 24, at 79.
67. See Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 944 n.15.
68. Id.
69. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 35, § 25, at 80-82; E. KINTNER, supra note 44, § 12.9; 2
P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 23, 515, at 344.
70. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 804-05 (1946); Denver Pe-
troleum Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 306 F. Supp. 289, 296-97 (D. Colo. 1969) (maintenance of
excessively low prices is evidence of monopoly power).
71. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 325-29 (D. Mass.
1953), aff d per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); LaPeyre v. F.T.C., 366 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir.
1966); Denver Petroleum Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 306 F. Supp. 289, 296-97 (D. Colo. 1969).
72. Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM Corp., 559 F.2d 488, 497 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978) (IBM's dominant position which forced two competitors out of
the computer leasing market and raised entry barriers is evidence of monopoly power).
73. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 881, 894-95 (S.D.N.Y.
1949).
74. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 805-06 (1946); Bass v.
Guld Oil Corp., 304 F. Supp. 1041, 1046 (S.D. Miss. 1969); 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
supra note 23, at 508, at 331; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 35, § 27, at 84-86; E. KINTNER,
supra note 44, § 12.10, at 360-61.
75. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 23, at 11 502b, 508-13c; L. SULLIVAN,
monopoly power, profits ordinarily must be considered in the long
run. In the short run, high profits may simply be the reward for
technical innovation or commercial success, and not the result of the
exercise of monopoly power."6
c. The Minimum Prerequisites for a Finding of Monopoly
Power.-Although many commentators have argued that market
structure and other evidence should be introduced to support the in-
ference of monopoly power, it is unclear whether, or to what extent,
this approach has been adopted by the courts. Many courts, al-
though mentioning structural evidence, apparently view market
share as the primary determinant of monopoly power. These courts
suggest that a market share approaching seventy percent is a prereq-
uisite for a finding of monopolization.7 7 Other courts have expanded
the concept of monopoly power, and suggest that even when market
share falls below fifty percent, appropriate structural or other evi-
dence may support a finding of monopoly power.78 Neither approach
has attracted a clear majority consensus.
(1) Focus on Market Share.-There is considerable sup-
port for the view that market share is the primary determinant of
monopoly power, and that a market share approaching seventy per-
cent is required for monopolization. The Supreme Court never has
affirmed a finding of monopolization against a defendant possessing
less than approximately seventy percent of the relevant market.79 In
supra note 35, § 26, at 83. For a series of papers and comments about using accounting rates
of return in performance analysis, see The Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return, 74 AM.
ECON. REV. 3, 492-517 (1984).
76. Dimmitt Agri Indus. Inc. v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 679 F.2d 516, 530 (5th Cir. 1982)
("Transitory control over prices, ever present in a competitive economy - in large part due to
lags in the responses of other buyers or producers - is not the subject of the completed mo-
nopolization offense."); United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 894-95 (D.N.J.
1949),final judgment, 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953); E. KINTNER, supra note 44, § 12.10,
at 361; 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 23, 530, at 396. Even if sustained over the
long run, high profits may not necessarily indicate monopoly power. United States v. E.I. Du-
Pont De Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 208 (D. Del. 1953) aff'd on other grounds, 351
U.S. 377 (1956) ("Years of profit do not establish monopoly power over prices. They establish
this: duPont was an efficient business company. Monopoly cases do not rest on such insubstan-
tial evidence to support complete power over price."); see also infra notes 263-66 and accom-
panying text (discussing view that high profits suggest efficiencies and not collusion or shared
monopoly).
77. See infra notes 79-105 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 106-35 and accompanying text.
79. The Supreme court upheld a finding of monopolization in the following cases, with
market shares as indicated: Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 105 S. Ct.
2847 (1985) (market shares exceeding 80% over a period of years); Otter Tail Power Co. v.
United States, 410 U.S. 366, 370 (1973) (90% market share); United States v. Grinnell Corp.,
384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (87%); Int'l Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S.
242, 249 (1959) (81%); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 167 (1948)
(70%); Amer. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 796 (1946) (68%); United States v.
Amer. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 162 (1911) (86%); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. I (1911) (90%); see also United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295,
Alcoa, which has been cited by the Supreme Court as being tanta-
mount to a Supreme Court decision, Judge Learned Hand stated
that "it is doubtful whether 60 or 64 percent" of the market would
be enough to support a finding of monopoly."0 Moreover, in United
States v. United States Steel Corp.,8" the Court was "certain" that a
defendant with a fifty percent market share had not achieved mo-
nopoly, because although "the power attained was much greater
than that possessed by any one competitor - it was not greater than
that possessed by all of them." 2
Lower court decisions similarly suggest that a market share ap-
proaching seventy percent is required to demonstrate monopoly
power. No circuit court has upheld a monopolization verdict in a
case in which a defendant possessed a market share of less than fifty
percent, 83 and only one court found a defendant with a market share
343 (D. Mass. 1953), affld per curiam, 347 U.S. 421 (1954) (75%); United States v. Pullman
Co., 50 F. Supp. 123, 135 (E.D. Pa. 1943), affd, 330 U.S. 806 (1947) (100%); United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (90%), adopted and approved
Amer. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811-14 (1946); United States v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 226 F. 62, 79 (W.D.N.Y. 1915), appeal dismissed, 255 U.S. 578 (1921) (75% to
80%). Cf. United States v. Besser Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp. 304, 307 (E.D. Mich. 1951) (65%
enough where balance divided between fifty small competitors), affid on other grounds, 343
U.S. 444 (1952).
In the following Supreme Court cases, monopoly power was not inferred from or found to
have been established by proof of the percentage of market shares: United States v. E.I. du-
Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 399 (1956) (17.9% market share); United States v.
Int'l Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 709-10 (1927) (64.1%); United States v. United States
Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 444-45 (1920) (50%); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.,
110 F. Supp. 295, 346 (D. Mass. 1953), affld per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (shares less
than 50%).
80. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Amer., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945); see
supra note 40.
81. 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
82. Id. at 444-45.
83. In the following circuit or district court cases, monopoly power was inferred from
or found to be established, with defendant's market share as indicated: Graphic Product Dis-
trib. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1570 (11th Cir. 1983) (70 to 75%); Associated Radio Serv.
Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 624 F.2d 1342, 1352 & n.18 (5th Cir. 1980) ("approximately 50%"
with high barriers to entry), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 1030 (1982); Heattransfer Corp. v. Volks-
wagenwerk A.G., 553 F.2d 964, 981 (5th Cir. 1977) (between 71 and 76%), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1087 (1978); Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701, 709 (7th Cir.
1977) (90%), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978); Greyhound Computer Corp. v. Int'l Business
Mach. Corp., 559 F.2d 488, 496 (9th Cir. 1977) (market share, even though falling from
87.5% in 1964, to 75.1% in 1967 and 64.68% in 1970, could reasonably imply monopoly
power), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978); Pacific Coast Agricultural Export Ass'n v. Sunkist
Growers, Inc., 526 F.2d 1196, 1204 (9th Cir. 1975) (45% increasing rapidly to 70%), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976); Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 473 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir.
1973) (65 to 70%); Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Amer., 438 F.2d
1286, 1307 (5th Cir. 1971) (90%), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Amplex of Maryland,
Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 380 F.2d 112, 114 (4th Cir. 1967) (about 60% market share),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 1036 (1968); North Texas Producers Ass'n v. Metzger Dairies, Inc.,
348 F.2d 189, 194 (5th Cir. 1965) (between 85 and 90%), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 977 (1966);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Amer. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (90%);
Southern Pacific Communications Co. v. Amer. Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F. Supp. 825 (D.D.C.
1982) (market share ranged from higher of 95.6% to low of 66.5%); Dankese Eng'g Inc. v.
Ionics, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 149, 153 (D. Mass. 1979) (90%); Brager Co. v. Leum Sec. Corp.,
of less than sixty percent to have monopolized.84 In the context of
motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, a number of cases sug-
gest that market shares in the range of forty to sixty percent make
429 F. Supp. 1341, 1347 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (70% or more); Precision Polymers, Inc. v. Pillar
Indus. Products Corp., 432 F. Supp. 700, 704 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (90%); Weber v. Wynne, 431
F. Supp. 1048, 1055 (D.N.J. 1977) (77% share created rebuttable presumption of monopoly
power); Cass Student Adv. v. Nat'l Educ. Adv. Serv., 407 F. Supp. 520, 522 (N.D. Ill. 1976)
(87 to 98%). aff d per curiam, 537 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1978); Pacific Eng'g Prod. Co. v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 1974-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,054 at 96,740 (D. Utah 1974) ("67% is on the
borderline but probably supports the inference"), rev'd in part on other grounds, 551 F.2d 790
(10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977); Credit Bureau Reports, Inc. v. Retail
Credit Co., 358 F. Supp. 780, 790-91 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (85%), aftd, 476 F.2d 989 (5th Cir.
1973); Denver Petroleum Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 306 F. Supp. 289, 296 (D. Colo. 1969)
(74.82%); United States v. General Instruments Corp., 87 F. Supp. 157, 195 (D.N.J. 1949)
(65 to 75%): United States v. Amer. Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18, 22 (N.D. Cal. 1945) (70%
product and 80% sales markets); United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 236 F. 62, 79
(W.D.N.Y. 1915) (75 to 80%).
By contrast, in the following district or circuit court cases market power was not inferred
from or found to have been established by proof of the percentage of market share: Transource
Int'l Inc. v. Trinity Indus, Inc., 725 F.2d 274, 283 (5th Cir. 1984) (summary judgment with
market shares of 4.1% to 8.3%); Shaurnoch v. Clark Oil and Refining Corp., 726 F.2d 291,
294 (6th Cir. 1984) (5.9%); American Bearing Co., Inc. v. Littleton Indus., Inc., 729 F.2d
943, 949 (3d Cir. 1984) (no percentage allegation); Dimmitt Agri Indus., Inc. v. CPC Int'l
Inc., 679 F.2d 516, 527 n.9 & 530-31 (5th Cir. 1982) (j. n.o.v. at 25% and 17%), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 1770 (1983); Nifty Foods Corp. v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 614
F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir. 1980) (summary judgment at 48.3% declining to 33%); Holleb & Co.
v. Produce Terminal Cold Storage Co., 532 F.2d 29, 33 (7th Cir. 1976) (J. n.o.v. where plain-
tiff failed to prove defendant had a "dominant share exceeding 60% of the market"); Yoder
Bros., Inc. v. Cal.-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1976) (49.6 to 64.1%
probably does not support the inference of monopoly power, while approximately 29% is insuf-
ficient "as a matter of law"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1976); Sulmeyer v. Coca Cola Co.,
515 F.2d 835, 850 (5th Cir. 1975) (22%), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1978); Bendix Corp. v.
Balax, Inc., 471 F.2d 149, 161-62 (7th Cir. 1972) (31.2%), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 819 (1973);
Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroeger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 207 (5th Cir. 1969) (no percentage
allegation); Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968, 974 (8th Cir. 1968) (20% com-
pletely inadequate); Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383, 390 (6th
Cir. 1962) (12.5%), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963); J.H. Westerbeke Corp. v. Onan Corp.,
580 F. Supp. 1173 (D. Mass. 1984) (20%); Levitch v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 495
F. Supp. 649, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (33% not enough as a matter of law); Jicarilla Apache
Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,042 at 77,177 (D.N.M. 1979)
(dismissal because 50% insufficient "as a matter of law"); Platt Saco Lowell, Ltd. v.
Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schorr, 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) V 61,898 at 73,775 (N.D. 11. 1977)
(dismissing Section 2 claim, court said there must be minimum 50% market share); Tire Sales
Corp. v. Cities Serv. Oil Corp., 410 F. Supp. 1222, 1230 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (64% is probably
inadequate while 33% definitely is inadequate); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Delta Communi-
cations Corp., 408 F. Supp. 1075, 1107 (S.D. Miss. 1976) (summary judgment at 41%), afd
per curiam, 579 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979); Jack Winter,
Inc. v. Koratron Co., 375 F. Supp. 1, 68 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (42%); Oak Distr. Co. v. Miller
Brewing Co., 370 F. Supp. 889, 899-900 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (less than 3%); Nankin Hosp. v.
Mich. Hosp. Serv., 361 F. Supp. 1199, 1209 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (not more than 50%); Cal.
Distrib. Co. v. Bay Distr., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1154, 1154 (M.D. Fla. 1971) (18%); United
States v. Keystone Watch Case Co., 218 F. Supp. 502, 512 (E.D. Pa. 1915) (42 to 47%).
84. Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 624 F.2d 1342, 1352 & n.18
(5th Cir. 1980) ("approximately 50%" with high barriers to entry); cf. Pacific Coast Agricul-
tural Export Ass'n v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 526 F.2d 1196, 1204 (9th Cir. 1975) (45% in-
creasing rapidly to 70%). Even the relatively low market share in Page Airways is deceptive,
since the case involved sale of equipment for a highly differentiated and expensive product - a
Grumman Gulfstream II airplane. The sale of even a single additional aircraft could have
significantly varied Page's market share. Page Airways, 624 F.2d at 1356-57; see also Dim-
mitt Agri Indus., 679 F.2d at 529 n.12 (discussing Page Airways).
monopolization an impossibility as a matter of law. 85
The extent to which some lower courts view a market share ap-
proaching seventy percent to be a prerequisite for a finding of mo-
nopoly power is highlighted by recent decisions in the Fifth and Sev-
enth Circuits. In Holleb & Co. v. Produce Terminal Cold Storage
Co., 86 Holleb alleged that Produce Terminal had monopolized and
attempted to monopolize the Chicago area frozen food market.8 " Af-
ter deliberating for three days, the jury failed to reach a verdict.
8 8
The district court subsequently granted defendant's motion for judg-
ment on all of plaintiff's claims, and plaintiff appealed. 9 The Sev-
enth Circuit, affirming the district court's decision, noted that
"[e]ven if plaintiff had properly defined a relevant market, it failed
to prove that Produce Terminal had a dominant share exceeding
60% of the market," so that "there was insufficient data before the
jury for it to conclude that Produce Terminal had the power to mo-
nopolize the relevant market."9 "
The Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Dimmitt Agri
Industries, Inc. v. CPC International, Inc.,91 which held that evi-
dence of low market shares made monopolization an impossibility
85. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. at 444-45 (1920) (Supreme Court was "cer-
tain" that defendant with 50% market share had not achieved monopoly, because although
"the power attained was much greater than that possessed by any one competitor - it was not
greater than that possessed by all of them."); Nifty Foods Corp. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co., 614 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir. 1980) (summary judgment at 48.3%); American Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. Delta Communications Corp., 408 F. Supp. 1075, 1107 (S.D. Miss. 1976) (TV
networks did not monopolize since they provided less than 50% of the network business); Hol-
leb & Co. v. Produce Terminal Cold Storage Co., 532 F.2d 29, 33 (7th Cir. 1976) (rejecting
Section 2 claim pursuant to Rule 50(b) motion because plaintiff failed to prove that defendant
"had a dominant share exceeding 60% of the market"); Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles
0. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264, 1274 (9th Cir. 1975); Telex Corp. v. Int'l Business Mach.
Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 919 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); Continental
Baking Co. v. Old Homestead Bread Co., 476 F.2d 97, 104 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 975 (1973) ("It is fairly clear that a market share of fifty-one percent would not consti-
tute monopoly power."); Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroeger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 207 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1969) ("It appears that something more than 50% of the market is a prerequisite to a
finding of monopoly power."); Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 1980-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 1163,042 at 77,177 (D.N.M. 1979) (case dismissed because defendant's 50% mar-
ket share was insufficien, "as a matter of law"); Platt Saco Lowell Ltd. v. Spindel Fabrik
Suessen-Schorr, 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 66,898 at 73,775 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (dismissing
section 2 claim because no minimum 50% market share).
86. 532 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1976).
87. Id. at 31.
88. id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 33. The court apparently rejected the attempted monopolization claim on the
same grounds. Id. at 32-33; see also infra notes 136-156 (discussing attempted
monopolization).
A similarly abrupt decision was reached in Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy
Corp., in which the court concluded that "[h]aving never acquired more than one-half of the
relevant market in liquid hydrocarbons in the San Juan Basin, neither [defendant], as a matter
of law, ever acquired a large enough proportion of the market to sustain plaintiff's claim of
monopoly." 1980-1 Trade Cas (CCH) 1 63,042 at 77,177 (D.N.M. 1979).
91. 679 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1982).
"as a matter of law" despite structural and other evidence of defend-
ant's power to control price and exclude competition.92 The district
court had found CPC guilty of monopolization and denied CPC's
motion for judgment n.o.v.9 a On appeal, Dimmitt did not challenge
CPC's claim that during 1971 and 1972 its maximum possible mar-
ket shares were only twenty-five percent and seventeen percent for
the national cornstarch and national corn syrup markets respec-
tively.9 Rather, Dimmitt maintained that there existed substantial
structural evidence to support the inference of monopoly power: the
corn wet milling industry was highly concentrated with five firms ac-
counting for over seventy-one percent of industry capacity; the de-
mand for cornstarch and corn syrup was price inelastic; and there
were few, if any, substitutes for cornstarch and corn syrup. 5 Dim-
mitt also introduced significant "conduct" evidence suggesting the
presence of monopoly power. An economic expert testified that the
product prices for cornstarch and corn syrup were inordinately low
in 1971 and 1972 while Dimmitt was in business, that these low
prices could not be explained statistically, and that the low product
prices were caused by the predatory pricing practices of the defen-
dants.96 Finally, Dimmitt introduced "performance" evidence of mo-
nopoly power, and offered proof that in 1971 and 1972, CPC exer-
cised a significant degree of control over price.
97
92. Id. at 529.
93. Id. at 518.
94. Id. at 528.
95. Id. Dimmitt's economic expert analyzed the relevant market and drew the follow-
ing conclusions:
1. That the corn wet milling industry was highly concentrated with five
firms accounting for over 71% of industry capacity.
2. That the demand for cornstarch and corn syrup was price inelastic.
3. That there were few if any substitutes for cornstarch and corn syrup.
4. That Dimmitt had an absolute cost advantage technologically, and thus
was able to overcome the typical barriers to entry.
5. That there had been a consistent and predictable growth in demand for
cornstarch and corn syrup over time and that this demand had equalled or ex-
ceeded increasing industry capacity.
6. That the product prices for cornstarch and corn syrup were inordinantly
low in 1971 and 1972 while Dimmitt was in business, and that those low prices
could not be explained statistically.
7. That the low product prices for cornstarch and corn syrup were not the
result of normal economic and market forces, but, rather, were caused by the
predatory pricing practices of the Defendants.
8. That the fixed and variable cost coefficients projected by Dimmitt were
accurate and realistic, even under the adverse anticompetitive activity of the De-
fendants, and would have resulted in substantial long-run profits had it not been
for the Defendants' successful attempt to illegally block Dimmitt's entry.
9. That the Defendants possessed the necessary market power, which was
overtly displayed in order to exclude new competition from the corn wet milling
industry . . ..
Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 528, 530 & n.15.
Despite the evidence of CPC's ability to control price and ex-
clude competition, 9 the Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court's denial
of defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v.99 Citing various Supreme
Court precedents, the Fifth Circuit noted the "considerable support
for the proposition that low market shares, if undisputed, make mo-
nopolization an impossibility as a matter of law."' 100 While the court
did not dispute Dimmitt's contention that in 1971 and 1972, CPC
exercised a significant control over prices, 10 the court nevertheless
declared that the "[t]ransitory control over prices, ever present in a
competitive economy - in large part due to lags in the responses of
other buyers or producers - is not the subject of the completed mo-
nopolization offense."'0 2 Characterizing the corn wet milling indus-
try as "only an oligopoly,' 0 3 the court held that Dimmitt's conduct
and structural evidence was "insufficient to overcome the presump-
tion against monopoly power implied by CPC's indisputably low
market shares in the two relevant undifferentiated products
.. ..4 The court concluded that "market shares in the range of
16 to 25 percent, such as those held by CPC, are insufficient - at
least absent other compelling structural evidence - as a matter of
law to support monopolization.' 0 5
(2) Focus on Structural Evidence.-Although there is
98. See supra notes 95-97. Dimmitt also introduced CPC managers' memoranda indi-
cating the company's intent to exclude other competitors from the market. Dimmilt, 679 F.2d
at 524. The court concluded that "Dimmitt can, with some justice, claim to have presented one
of the clearest conduct evidence cases supportive of a monopolizing intent that has been
presented to a court ...." Id.
99. Dimmitt, 679 F.2d at 531.
100. Id. at 529 (citing United States Steel and Alcoa); see also supra notes 79-83 and
accompanying text (discussing United States Steel, Alcoa, and other Supreme Court prece-
dent which suggests that low market shares make monopolization impossible).
101. Dimmitt, 679 F.2d at 530 & n.15.
102. Id. at 530. While acknowledging that in an oligopolistic market, a price leader may
possess some control over prices or output, id. at 53 1, the court nevertheless concluded that "to
embrace any degree of market power, would complicate enforcement, overwhelm the enforce-
ment machinery, and deter arguably legitimate conduct." Id.
103. Id. at 531; see also infra note 176 and accompanying text (defining oligopoly).
104. Dimmitt, 679 F.2d at 531.
105. Id. at 529. The "at least absent other compelling structural evidence" qualification
might suggest that, given appropriate structural evidence, monopolization might be possible
even when market shares are low. See infra notes 114-18 and accompanying text (reviewing
case law supporting the view that low market shares alone do not make monopolization impos-
sible). An alternative interpretation, however, is equally plausible. The Dimmitt Court avoided
holding - although it felt Supreme Court precedent suggested the possibility - that low
market shares make monopolization impossible, but rather limited its holding to disposition of
the case. The court indicated that Dimmitt offered unsatisfactory structural evidence, and
that, absent compelling structural evidence (implying that possibly even with such evidence),
market shares in the range of 16 to 25 percent make monopolization an impossibility as a
matter of law. Dimmitt, 679 F.2d at 528-29. A subsequent Fifth Circuit decision supports this
interpretation. See Transource Int'l v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 725 F.2d 274, 274 (5th Cir. 1984)
(Dimmitt, other Fifth Circuit decisions, and Supreme Court precedent "make clear that low
market shares make monopolization impossible").
strong support for the view that low market shares make monopoli-
zation impossible,106 there also is support for the view that no mini-
mum market share is required for a finding of monopolization. The
Supreme Court has never developed a flat rule regarding the market
share required for monopoly power." 7 Rather, in United States v.
Columbia Steel Co.,' 08 the Court indicated that the relative effect of
percentage command of a market varies with the setting in which
that factor is placed.109 Thus, in United Shoe the Court relied upon
not only market share, but also structural evidence, to support the
inference of monopoly power."10 The Court noted in dicta that shares
in the range of fifteen to forty-nine percent do not indicate a prima
facie monopoly, implying by negative inference that a firm with
those shares could be shown, with barrier to entry or other evidence,
to have the power to control prices or exclude competition."'
Lower court decisions also suggest that, with appropriate struc-
tural evidence, monopoly power may be found even when market
share is low. In two cases, market shares of approximately sixty per-
cent, together with evidence of high barriers to entry, supported a
finding of monopoly power,"' while in another case, a share of only
fifty percent was sufficient.1 1 3 Moreover, several courts have stated
that there is no rigid rule requiring even fifty percent of the market
for a monopolization offense." 4 Therefore, to the extent that, on
106. See supra notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
107. E. KINTNER, supra note 44, § 12.6, at 351-52; see also infra note 123 and accom-
panying text.
108. 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
109. Id. at 527-28 & n.25.
110. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953),
affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); see also supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text
(discussing United Shoe).
I II. United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 335; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 35, at 76. In United
States v. Besser Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp. 304 (E.D. Mich. 1951), affd, 343 U.S. 444 (1952), the
court, while refusing to decide whether defendant's control of 33% of output was monopoly
power, noted that in United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920), 33.5% of the total
output of coal, carried by defendant, was thought to amount to a monopoly, and that in United
States v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 254 U.S. 255 (1920), a figure of 18.84% was considered to
be enough. Besser, 96 F. Supp. at 307. However, the actual holding in Besser was based on a
restraint of trade theory, not on monopolization. Thus the court's comments concerning Su-
preme Court market share analysis are uncontrolling dicta. Id. at 314.
112. See Amplex of Med., Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 380 F.2d 112, 114 (4th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 1036 (1968) (about 60% market share); United Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 245 F. Supp. 161, 170 (D. Conn. 1965), affid, 362 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1966)
(60.5%).
113. Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, 624 F.2d 1342, 1352 & n.18 (5th Cir.
1980) ("approximately 50%" with high barriers to entry); see also Pacific Coast Agriculture
Export Ass'n v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 526 F.2d 1196, 1204 (9th Cir. 1975) (45% increasing
rapidly to 70%); supra note 84 (discussing Page Airways).
114. See, e.g., Hayden Publishing Co., Inc. v. Cox Broadcasting Corp., 730 F.2d 64, 69
n.7 (2d Cir. 1984) (party may have monopoly power in particular market, even though its
market share is less than 50%); Yoder Bros., Inc. v. Cal.-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347,
1367 & n.1f9 (5th Cir. 1976) (no rigid rule requiring 50% of the market for a monopolization
offense); United States v. CBS, Inc., 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,394 at 76,380 (C.D. Cal.
other occasions, these same courts stated that a fifty percent market
share was a "prerequisite" for a finding of monopoly, 115 these courts
apparently were assessing only the significance of the share possessed
by a particular defendant in a particular market, rather than en-
deavoring to extrapolate a general rule.116 Indeed, although Dimmitt
cited Supreme Court precedent for the proposition that low market
shares make monopolization an impossibility as a matter of law,'
1 7
Dimmitt's actual holding may have retreated somewhat from this
rule; the Fifth Circuit held that "market shares in the range of 16 to
25 percent . . . are insufficient - at least absent other compelling
structural evidence - as a matter of law to support monopoliza-
tion."1118 This seems to imply that with appropriate structural evi-
dence, a defendant with a market share as low as sixteen to twenty-
five percent might be found to be a monopolist."'
In the context of motions to dismiss, or for summary judgment,
a number of recent decisions emphasize the extent to which some
courts are willing to accept the possibility of monopolization even
when market share is low.' 20 For example, in Broadway Delivery
Corp. v. United Parcel Service,'' the Second Circuit found im-
proper a jury charge that "possession of less than 50% of the market
fails to establish monopoly power."' 2 The court noted the trend to
give only weight and not conclusiveness to market share evidence,
23
and to refuse to adopt a particular market share as necessary for a
firm to be able to control prices or exclude competition. 24 The court
concluded that motions for summary judgment or directed verdict
could be granted only "if the defendant's share is less than 50%, or
even somewhat above the figure, and the record contains no signifi-
1978) (market shares of less than 50% may give rise to monopoly power finding).
115. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
116. Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel Serv., 651 F.2d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 1981).
117. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
118. Dimmitt, 679 F.2d at 529.
119. Id.; see also Transource Int'l, Inc. v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 725 F.2d 274, 283 n.1 I &
284 (5th Cir. 1984) (granting summary judgment at 4.1% to 8.3% market shares, but noting
plaintiff failed to introduce compelling barrier to entry or other structural evidence of monop-
oly power).
120. See infra notes 121-136 and accompanying text; see also Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc.
v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1369 (1981)
(allegation of 65% market share sufficient in itself to withstand motion for summary judg-
ment); American Standard, Inc. v. Bendix Corp., 487 F. Supp. 265, 269 (W.D. Mo. 1980)
(summary judgment denied, no percentage allegation); Fox Chemical Co. v. Amsoil, Inc., 445
F. Supp. 1355, 1360 (D. Minn. 1978) (summary judgment denied, no percentage allegation);
Brager & Co., Inc. v. Leumi Sec. Corp., 429 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (summary judg-
ment denied where 60% share allegation).
121. 651 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
122. Id. at 127.
123. Id. at 128 (citing United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948)).
124. Id. (citing 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER. ANTITRUST LAW 905-15 (1978) and
Landes & Posner, supra note 1).
cant evidence concerning the market structure to show that the de-
fendant's share of that market gives it monopoly power." '125
In Hayden Publishing Co., Inc. v. Cox Broadcasting Corp.,1 6
the Second Circuit clarified its Broadway Delivery holding by indi-
cating that the burden of demonstrating the absence of significant
structural evidence of monopoly power rests with the moving
party.127 In Hayden, the district court adopted an expansive view of
the relevant market128 and granted defendants' motion for summary
judgment. 29 However, the court failed to include in the record any
discussion of structural or other evidence of monopoly power."' On
appeal, the Second Circuit cited Broadway Delivery for two proposi-
tions: that the structure of the market must be considered in deter-
mining whether monopoly power exists,'' and that a party may have
monopoly power in a particular market even though its market share
is less than fifty percent. 32 Adding that, in the context of a motion
for summary judgment, "'the burden [is] on the moving party to
demonstrate the absence of any material factual issue genuinely in
dispute . ., "133 the court then reversed and remanded.' 3' The
court concluded that "[s]ince Cox and UTP moved for summary
judgment on Hayden's section 2 claims, they had the burden of dem-
onstrating that there was no factual support for the allegation that
EEM had monopoly power, even if the relevant market was larger
than Hayden maintained."' 3 5
B. The Attempted Monopolization Offense
1. Attempted Monopolization Defined.-"Attempt to monopo-
lize" is the second Section 2 offense which raises the issue of monop-
oly power.' 36 The Supreme Court has never discussed the elements
of this attempt offense in substantial detail, primarily because in
most cases reaching the Supreme Court the allegations of attempt to
125. Broadway Delivery, 651 F.2d at 128.
126. 730 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1984).
127. Id. at 69.
128. Id. at 67.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 69.
131. Id. at 68-69 (citing Broadway Delivery, 651 F.2d at 128).
132. Id. at 69 n.7 (citing Broadway Delivery, 651 F.2d at 130).
133. Id. at 68 (quoting Heyman v. Commerce & Industry Insurance Co., 524 F.2d
1317, 1320 (2d Cir. 1975)).
134. Id. at 71.
135. Id. at 69.
136. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (quoting Sherman Act attempted monop-
olization provisions). For a discussion of the attempt offense, see generally Attempts to Mo-
nopolize: A Symposium, 38 OHIo ST. L.J. 245 (1977); Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization:
A Mildly Expansionary Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section 2, 72 MICH. L. REV.
373 (1974).
monopolize have been coupled with charges of completed monopoli-
zation, conspiracy to monopolize, or conspiracy to restrain trade. The
attempt issue has received only incidental treatment.1 7 The vast ma-
jority '3 8 of lower courts, however, require that a plaintiff alleging an
attempt to monopolize show two elements: a specific intent, evi-
denced by overt acts, to exclude competitors and gain monopoly
power;13 9 and a "dangerous probability" of success in achieving that
monopoly power.140 Thus, in itself, "monopoly power" is not a neces-
sary element in the cause of action. The attempted monopolization
offense is intended to reach acts which fall short of obtaining monop-
oly power and which would be insufficient to support a completed
monopolization charge.' 14  Nevertheless, for a plaintiff to demon-
strate a "dangerous probability" of monopolization, some examina-
tion of market share and market structure is required."4 2
2. Proving a Dangerous Probability of Monopolization.-The
form of market analysis employed in an attempt case appears to be
substantially the same as that used in completed monopolization
cases.1 43 Courts in attempt cases generally require definition of the
137. See ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 46, at 386. The Supreme Court provided its
clearest pronouncement concerning the elements of the attempted monopolization offense in
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946). There, the Court approved a
jury instruction defining attempt to monopolize as "the employment of methods, means and
practices, which would, if successful, accomplish monopolization, and which, though falling
short, nevertheless approach so close as to create a dangerous probability of it." Id. at 785; see
also Loraine Journal v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 153-54 (1951); Swift Co. v. United
States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905) ("[W]hen that intent [to monopolize] and the consequent
dangerous probability exist, [the Sherman Act], like many others and like the common law in
some cases, directs itself against that dangerous probability as well as against the completed
result.").
138. The Ninth circuit stands alone in asserting that a dangerous probability of monopo-
lization is not an essential element of the attempted monopolization offense. See infra note 153
and accompanying text. The vast majority of circuit courts reject this view, which appears to
be inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
139. Times-Picayune v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
140. In American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 785 (1946), the Supreme
Court approved a jury instruction requiring a demonstration of a dangerous probability of
monopolization as an element of the attempted monopolization offense. See supra note 137.
Since that time, the vast majority of lower courts have explicitly required proof of the danger-
ous probability element. See, e.g., C.E. Serv., Inc. v. Central Data Corp., 759 F.2d 1241, 1244
(5th Cir. 1985); Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 711 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 298-99 (8th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977); FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,
543 F.2d 1019, 1030 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1097 (1977); E.J. Delaney Corp. v.
Bonne Bell, Inc., 525 F.2d 296, 305-06 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976);
Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338, 1348 (3d Cir. 1975); see also Kintner
& Goldston, Section 2 of the Sherman Act: The Attempt to Monopolize Offense, 24
N.Y.L.S.L. REv. 577, 599 & n.121, 605 & n.140 (1979). But see infra note 153 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Ninth Circuit view that dangerous probability of monopolization is not
required to show attempted monopolization).
141. See supra note 140.
142. See infra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
143. See Kintner & Goldston, supra note 140, at 600.
relevant product and geographic markets and determination of the
defendant's market share in the relevant market.' 4
In an attempt case, the defendant's market share need not yet
have reached monopoly proportions; there is little consensus among
courts as to how large the market share must be to find an attempt.
If a firm's large share of a relevant market implies monopoly power,
it is reasonable to define a dangerous probability of monopoly power
in terms of a proximately reduced market share. As a rule of thumb
it appears that a market share exceeding fifty percent is sufficient to
demonstrate a dangerous probability of monopolization, while a
share below fifty percent makes a finding of attempted monopoliza-
tion improbable and a market share below twenty percent makes at-
tempted monopolization an impossibility as a matter of law. 4 5
144. Id.; see also Yoder Bros., Inc. v. Cal.-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1368
(5th Cir. 1976) (like the monopolization offense, the attempt offense must occur within defined
relevant market); see also American Bearing Co., Inc. v. Litton Indus., 729 F.2d 943, 949 (3d
Cir. 1984) ("Both monopolization and attempted monopolization claims require [plaintiff] to
present sufficient evidence to permit a jury to find that the defendant possessed the requisite
market power necessary to constitute a monopoly.").
145. A dangerous probability of monopolization has been found in the following cases,
with defendant's share of the relevant market indicated: McDonald v. Johnson & Johnson, 537
F. Supp. 1282, 1345-46 (D. Minn. 1982) (37% sufficient under specific market conditions
shown); W.L. Gore & Assoc. v. Carlisle Corp., 381 F. Supp. 680, 704 (D. Del. 1974) (40-60%
sufficient), afd in part on other grounds, 529 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1976); Lektro-Vend Corp. v.
Vendo Co., 403 F. Supp. 527, 534 (N.D. Ill. 1975), a ff'd, 545 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1976),.rev'd
on other grounds, 433 U.S. 623 (1977) (20% in an increasingly concentrated industry is suffi-
cient); Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler-Corp., 525 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1975); Outboard
Marine Corp. v. Prezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978) (35% enough). The Ninth Circuit,
which does not require a showing of dangerous probability of monopolization to recover for
attempted monopolization, see supra, note 138, has found attempted monopolization where
defendant possessed only 24% of the relevant market. See Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v.
Charles 0. Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 1291, 1300-01, 1309 (9th Cir. 1982) (24% market share
plus anticompetitive conduct supported finding of attempted monopolization). In the following
cases, evidence of defendant's market share was sufficient to defeat summary judgment for
defendant: Clausen & Sons v. Theodore Hamm Brewing Co., 284 F. Supp. 148 (D. Minn.
1967), rev'd on other grounds, 395 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1968) (35% to 50%); Campbell Distrib.
Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 208 F. Supp. 523, 528 (D. Md. 1962) (5% to 6%).
In the following cases, attempted monopolization was not found, with defendant's share of
the relevant market as indicated: Deauville Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 756 F.2d
1183 (5th Cir. 1985) (no market share allegation); Transource Int'l v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 725
F.2d 274, 283 (5th Cir. 1984) (summary judgment at 4.1% to 8.3%); Domed Stadium Hotel,
Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480, 491 (5th Cir. 1984) (summary judgment at 4%);
American Bearing Co., Inc. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 729 F.2d 943 (3d Cir. 1984) (no percentage
allegation); J.T. Gibbons, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 704 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1983) (directed
verdict, small share and industry highly competitive); United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537
F.2d 296, 306-07 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977) (50% market share with
minimal barriers to entry insufficient); Yoder Bros., Inc. v. Cal.-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d
1347, 1368-69 (5th Cir. 1976) (directed verdict, 20% market share with low barriers to entry);
Holleb & Co. v. Produce Terminal Cold Storage, 532 F.2d 29, 32-33 (7th Cir. 1976) (j.n.o.v.
in completed and attempted monopolization action where even if plaintiff properly defined
relevant market, it failed to prove defendant had dominant share exceeding 60% of market);
Whitten v. Paddock Pool Builders, 508 F.2d 547 (Ist Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004
(1975) (3%); Mullis v. Arco Petroleum Corp., 502 F.2d 290, 297 (7th Cir. 1974) (3%); Bendix
Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 471 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1972) (31.2% held doubtful dangerous probability,
but decision against attempted monopolization rested on other grounds); Advance Business
Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 287 F. Supp. 143 (D. Md. 1968), afl'd, 415 F.2d 55 (4th
There are, however, a number of cases which do not fall within
these suggested guidelines and considerable confusion persists.1" For
example, while in several cases a market share in the range of fifty
to sixty percent was insufficient to create a dangerous probability, 47
another case found an allegation that defendant possessed six per-
cent of the relevant market sufficient to defeat a motion for sum-
mary judgment for defendant.14 8 Similarly, while some courts appar-
ently focus on market shares as the primary measure of dangerous
probability, 149 other courts emphasize that even when defendant's
market share falls well below fifty percent, barrier to entry or other
structural evidence may support a finding of attempted
monopolization. 50
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970) (3% to 4%); Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Com-
pany, 402 F.2d 968, 974 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 961 (1969) (market share of
less than 50% might support finding of attempted monopoly in some circumstances but 20% is
insufficient as a matter of law); J.H. Westerbeke Corp. v. Onan Corp., 580 F. Supp. 1173,
1190-91 (D. Mass. 1984).(20%); Harris v. Atlantic-Richfield Co., 469 F. Supp. 759, 763
(E.D.N.C. 1978) (3%); Stifel, Nicholas & Co. v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 430 F. Supp.
1234, 1242-43 (N.D. Iowa 1977) (less than 30% insufficient); Giant Paper & Film Corp. v.
Albemarle Paper Co., 430 F. Supp. 981 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (summary judgment at 14%); Diehl
& Sons, Inc. v. Int'l Harvester Co., 426 F. Supp. 110 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (20%); I. Haas Truck-
ing Co. v. New York Fruit Auction Corp., 364 F. Supp. 868, 874-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (10%);
Allen Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. John A. Denie's Sons Co., 1972 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,955
(W.D. Tenn. 1972) (granting judgment notwithstanding verdict to defendant who was second
largest in its market); Cal Distrib. Co. v. Bay Distrib., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1154 (M.D. Fla.
1971) (defendant was second in its market); SCM Corp. v. RCA, 318 F. Supp. 433, 472-73
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Diamond Int'l Corp. v. Walterhoefer, 289 F. Supp. 550 (D. Md. 1968) (no
dangerous probability where there was a decline in market share from 52% to 51% over the
conduct period); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 566-67 (E.D.
Pa. 1960) (market share rising from 1.5% to 10%).
As a general guideline in attempt cases, Areeda and Turner suggest that claims involving
thirty percent market share or lower should presumptively be rejected. They would also "nor-
mally [with two exceptions for invidious conduct] reject an attempt claim" involving shares in
the 30 to 50% range. Claims involving shares in excess of 50% should presumptively be treated
as attempts. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 24, 835c, at 350.
146. Recently, for example, the Fifth Circuit specifically declined to decide whether a
25% share of the relevant market might sustain an attempted monopolization claim. C.E. Serv.
Inc. v. Control Data Corp., 759 F.2d 1241, 1245 (5th Cir. 1985) (reversing summary judg-
ment); see also United States v. Amer. Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d 1114, 1118-21 (5th Cir. 1984);
Multiflex, Inc. v. Samuel Moore & Co., 709 F.2d 980, 990-94 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1594 (1984); Dimmitt Agri. Indus., Inc. v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 679 F.2d 516, 531-33
(5th Cir. 1982).
147. United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 306-07 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977) (50% market share in market with minimal barriers to entry
insufficient to show attempted monopolization); Holleb & Co. v. Produce Terminal Cold Stor-
age Co., 532 F.2d 29, 32-33 (7th Cir. 1976) (judgment for defendant in action for completed
and attempted monopolization since even if plaintiff properly defined relevant market, it failed
to prove defendant had dominant share exceeding 60% of market); Diamond Int'l Corp. v.
Walterhoefer, 289 F. Supp. 550 (D. Md. 1968) (no dangerous probability of monopolization
where market share declined from 52% to 51% over conduct period).
148. Campbell Distrib. Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 208 F. Supp. 523, 528 (D.
Md. 1962) (5% to 6% market share alleged).
149. See supra note 147.
150. E.g., Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480, 490 (5th Cir.
1984).
3. The Expansion of Section 2 To Control Conduct in Verti-
cal Relationships.-The effort of some courts to expand the applica-
bility of Section 2 in vertical relationships further complicates the
analysis of attempted monopolization cases.151 Some Third Circuit
courts, for example, have adopted narrow market definitions which
have the effect of overstating the defendant's market power. 152 Simi-
larly, some Ninth Circuit courts do not require proof of a dangerous
probability of attaining monopoly power."'
The vast majority of circuits, however, refuse to expand Section
2 in this manner. Most circuits not only reject plaintiffs' efforts to
define the market in terms of a single product, 15  but also view a
dangerous probability of monopolization as an essential element of
the attempted monopolization offense. 55 Moreover, recent decisions
indicate that both the Third and the Ninth Circuits may be retreat-
ing somewhat from their previous positions. 56
151. See Martin, Use of Section 2 to Control Conduct in Vertical Relationships - An
Opportunity or an Abuse?, in ANTITRUST POLICY IN TRANSITION: THE CONVERGENCE OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS 397 (E. Fox & J. Halverson eds. 1984).
152. See, e.g., Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1975);
Rca v. Ford Motor Co., 355 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd and remanded, 497 F.2d 577
(3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868 (1974); Mt. Lebanon Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler
Corp., 283 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. Pa. 1968), afl'd on other grounds, 417 F.2d 622 (3d Cir.
1969).
153. The Ninth Circuit has essentially eliminated the dangerous-probability-of-monopo-
lization requirement by holding that dangerous probability of success may be shown either by
direct proof of market power or by inference from proven specific intent. Sherman v. British
Leyland Motors, Ltd., 601 F.2d 429, 453 n.47 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040
(1978); Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 474 (9th Cir. 1964) (rejecting premise that
probability of actual monopolization is essential element of proof of attempt to monopolize),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
154. See, e.g., Dunn & Mavis, Inc. v. Nu-Car Driveaway, Inc., 691 F.2d 241 (6th Cir.
1982); Blackwell v. Power Test Corp., 540 F. Supp. 802 (D.N.J. 1981), affd, 688 F.2d 818
(3d Cir. 1982); Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 117-18 (3d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981); McDaniel v. General Motors Corp., 480 F.
Supp. 666, 674-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), af'd, 628 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir. 1980); H&B Equipment
Co. v. Int'l Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 242-43 (5th Cir. 1978); Shaurnoch v. Clark Oil &
Refining Co., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,093 at 71,141 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Capitol Ice
Cream Wholesalers v. Mid-Atlantic Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH)
65,068 at 70,984 (D.D.C. 1982); Neugebauer v. A.S. Abell Co., 474 F. Supp. 1053 (D. Md.
1979). But see Martin Ice Cream Co. v. Chipwich, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);
Loube v. Chrysler Corp., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,098 at 71,158 (D. Md. 1983); Joe
Westbrook, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 419 F. Supp. 824, 840-41 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
155. See supra note 140.
156. Recently, the Ninth Circuit has retreated from a strict application of Lessig v.
Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1964) without reinstating the traditional elements.
Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,239 at
69,406 (9th Cir. 1983) (dangerous probability of success cannot be inferred from conduct
alone unless conduct is predatory or anticompetitive and forms basis for substantial claim of
restraint of trade); General Business Sys. v. North Amer. Philips Corp., 1982-83 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 65,177 (9th Cir. 1983) (although dangerous probability of success may be inferred
from conduct, plaintiff's failure to define relevant market properly was fatal to attempt
claims).
Similarly, in several recent decisions, the Third Circuit rejected attempted monopolization
claims based on allegations of a single product market. Blackwell v. Power Test Corp., 540 F.
Supp. 802, 809-10 (D.N.J. 1981), affd, 688 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1982); Edward J. Sweeney &
I11. The Economics of Market Share, Market Structure, and Mo-
nopoly Power
While courts struggle with the concept of monopoly power,
economists are devoting increasing attention to this issue. Two areas
of economic analysis are of particular concern: dominant firm analy-
sis; 157 and tests of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm. 158
A. Dominant Firm Analysis
Dominant firm theory applies to the situation in which one firm
has an overwhelming market share, but faces the actual or potential
competition of much smaller rivals.' 59 In this case, the price set by
the dominant firm is essentially a monopoly price, with the impor-
tant qualification that the dominant firm takes into account the re-
sponses of its smaller competitors as prices rise. 6 '
Dominant firm analysis is clearly applicable to antitrust monop-
olization cases. Section 2 of the Sherman Act requires as a neces-
sary, but not sufficient condition for monopolization, that a firm have
the power to control price or exclude competition.' 6 ' This implies
that the firm, acting on its own, must have the ability to determine
price - a condition that corresponds closely to the economic concept
of the dominant firm.
Dominant firm theory does not, however, present clear guide-
lines concerning the market share required for dominance. Professors
Scherer'62 and Stigler'63 believe that a firm possessing at least a
forty percent market share with no close rivals can be defined as
dominant. Professors Areeda and Turner, on the other hand, appar-
ently feel that a market share in excess of sixty percent is re-
quired. 164 As a practical matter, though, neither position can be
Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 117-18 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911
(1981).
157. See infra notes 159-68 and accompanying text.
158. See infra notes 170-242 and accompanying text.
159. See F. SCHERER, supra note 51, at 232-43.
160. Id.
161. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
162. Professor Scherer describes the dominant firm as "a firm controlling roughly 40
percent or more of its industry's output, but faced with the actual or potential competition of
fringe rivals, each too small to exert an appreciable influence on price through its output deci-
sions." F. SCHERER, supra note 51, at 232.
163. Professor Stigler describes the dominant firm as "a relatively large firm, producing,
say 40 percent of the output of the industry at a minimum, and more if the second firm is
large (because otherwise the situation approaches classical duopoly)." F. SCHERER, supra note
51, at 228.
164. Arecda and Turner suggest that:
Market share offers a preliminary though not conclusive, guide to dominance. As
a first approximation, some market share test may be inevitable in any approach
that imposes more severe predation rules on a "dominant firm" than on others.
But market shares are extremely crude indicators of market power, and a sixty
adopted with confidence. Theory yields little guidance here except to
require that the dominant firm's market share be much greater than
that of its rivals. 165 Moreover, neither the threshold market share
required for dominance nor the dominant firm theory in general have
been tested empirically except by anecdotes applying to single
markets.
1 66
As a matter of theory, though, dominant firm analysis raises an
important issue. A commonly accepted extension of dominant firm
analysis is that if the leader in the industry has no special advantage
in cost or consumer loyalty, then the smaller firms will expand and
in the long run the leading firm's dominance will disappear.16 7 Thus,
some authors suggest that Section 2 of the Sherman Act be scrapped
without replacement. These authors argue that by the time courts
decide and grant relief in most monopolization cases, the defendant's
market share erodes.16 8 A full analysis of this proposition clearly is
beyond the scope of this article, and as a practical matter the repeal
of Section 2 seems doubtful. It is worth mentioning, however, that
the limited available studies support the conclusion that dominant
firms decline. 69
percent test seems much too inclusive. Uncertain as the profitability of limit-
pricing behavior may be for a monopolist, it is even more risky for a firm facing
existing rivals accounting for forty percent of the market-rivals whose competi-
tion may erode the future profits necessary to make a present sacrifice of profits
by limit pricing worthwhile. One might, of course, specify a substantially higher
market share, say eighty or ninety percent, but then the output rule would rarely
be applicable.
4 P. AREEDA AND D. TURNER, supra note 124, at 1347-48. While Areeda and Turner do not
embrace a specific market share required for dominance, they apparently feel it should exceed
60%; it seems doubtful that they thought their 80% or 90% examples were outrageous. Id.
165. See Landes & Posner, supra note I, at 944 n.15; see also supra notes 66-68 and
accompanying text (discussing the size and distribution of competitors as a structural factor
affecting the ability of a firm to control price).
166. Few tests of the dominant firm theory are conducted because of the widespread
belief that market dominance - as reflected by situations in which a single firm has a large
market share and all competitors are small - is rare in the U.S. economy. Moreover, statisti-
cal inadequacies make empirical testing difficult - the census does not publish market shares
because of the obvious disclosures at issue. Thus, most analysis of the dominant firm theory
involves only anecdotal discussions of particular firms in particular markets. See F. SCHERER,
supra note 51, at 239-43 (discussing in particular the history of the United States Steel Corpo-
ration); see also infra note 169 (discussing studies of the view that dominant firms decline over
time).
167. See F. SCHERER, supra note 51, at 238-40; Worcester, Why Dominant Firms De-
cline, 65 J. POL. ECON. 338 (1957).
168. See R. POSNER. ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE chs. I, 5, 8 (1976);
R. BORK. THE ANTITRUST PARADOX chs. 7, 8 (1978).
169. Data limitations and other problems generally prevent detailed analysis of the dom-
inant firm theory. See supra note 166. Case studies of particular firms in particular markets,
however, indicate that there are many examples of dominant firms which have declined over
time. See F. SCHERER, supra note 51, at 239-42 (discussing the decline of U.S. Steel Corp.,
Reynolds International Pen Corp., and American Can Corp.). Compare Weiss, The Concen-
tration-Profits Relationship and Antitrust, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW
LEARNING 184, 186-87 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann, and J. Weston, Eds. 1974). Weiss uses a
subjective "test" to conclude that certain dominant firms are protected from the expansion of
B. The Price and Profit Consequences of Market Structure
A second area of economic analysis relevant to the law of mo-
nopolization involves the so-called "structure-conduct-performance
paradigm" or "market concentration doctrine."17 This is the theory
that certain market structures are conducive to monopolistic con-
duct, which in turn determines economic performance.17 1 In the
realm of pricing, for example, monopolistic conduct may involve
pricing above costs, which can be expected to result in increased per-
formance as measured by higher profits."7
The structure-conduct-performance paradigm is relevant to an-
titrust monopolization litigation in two ways. First, the paradigm
suggests that structural factors, such as barriers to entry, are condu-
cive to monopolistic conduct.173 The doctrine thus is an important
theoretical justification for the general proposition that market struc-
ture evidence should play a significant role in cases in which it is
impossible to infer monopoly power from market share alone.' 74
Second, some economists use the structure-conduct-performance
paradigm to attempt to equate oligopoly power with monopoly
power.' 5 Essentially, an oligopoly market is "one in which a few
relatively large sellers account for all or the bulk of the output," so
that "substantial output variations by any one of the leading sellers
will have a noticeable impact on the market price and on rivals.' 76
"Interdependence" thus is a distinctive feature of oligopoly mar-
kets.177 An oligopolist cannot alone determine price - its market
power is dependent upon joint or collusive action by at least some of
its competitors - and so it ordinarily cannot be the subject of a
completed monopolization offense. 178 In the view of some commenta-
tors, however, the structure-conduct-performance paradigm suggests
that the structure of the market gives a reliable index of monopoly
minor firms by high barriers to entry, but admits that no systematic analysis is possible be-
cause of the unavailability of market share data.
170. See F. SCHERER, supra note 51, at 3-6.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 268.
173. Id.
174. See supra notes 47-68 and accompanying text.
175. See infra notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
176. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 23, at 272-73; see also F. SCHERER, supra
note 51, at 67 (suggesting that oligopoly exists when the leading firms control 40% or more of
the total market). One case describes a "tight oligopoly" as a market which is highly concen-
trated and in which eight or fewer firms supply over 50% of the market, with the largest firm
at least 20%. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 349 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir.
1968). Northern Natural defines a "partial monopoly" as a market in which one supplier
controls 60% of the market and no other single seller has a significant proportion. Id.
177. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 23, at 272-73.
178. See, e.g., Dimmitt Agri Indus., Inc. v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 679 F.2d 516, 531 (5th Cir.
1982).
power, and that the correlation between high market concentration
and high levels of profit is positive and direct.17 The logical implica-
tion of this approach is that oligopolistic industries may impose
deadweight welfare losses on the community even without collud-
ing. 18° If technological change is not unnecessarily retarded and if
intervention is cheap, the suggestion is that society would benefit
from the break-up of dominant firms, the prohibition of horizontal
mergers, and the demolition of barriers to entry."'1
/. Testing the Structure-Conduct-Performance Para-
digm.-ln recent years, the structure-performance hypothesis has
been the subject of considerable empirical research, in part because
tests of the theory are easily prepared.18 Profits may be described as
a function of several structural variables:
(1) = f (C, B, n, e).
In the formula, is an average price cost margin or other substitute
measure for profits,183 C is the industry concentration ratio, 84 B is a
measure of various barriers to entry,185 n is the elasticity of demand
179. See infra notes 187-94 and accompanying text.
180. Id.
181. M. WATERSON, supra note 53, at 209.
182. See F. SCHERER, supra note 51, at 267.
183. Monopoly power presumably enables sellers to hold prices above competitive levels.
See supra note 178. Several measures of this "monopoly profit" have been proposed. The Ler-
ner index, or ratio of price minus marginal cost to price, is well based in theory but is imprac-
ticable due to the lack of systematic data on the ratio of marginal costs to prices. See F.
SCHERER, supra note 51, at 269; see also Pindick, The Measurement of Monopoly Power in
Dynamic Markets, 28 J. LAW & ECON. 193 (1985). Another suggested measure is the return
on stockholder's equity. F. Scherer, supra note 51, at 269. By far the most popular measure,
however, is the price cost margin (PCM or "margin"). The PCM takes advantage of the avail-
ability of the U.S. Census Bureau's statistics on manufacturing activity at the level of individ-
ual plants, and can be defined approximately as follows:
PCM - Total Plant Sales - Material Costs - In-Plant Payroll Costs.
Total Plant Sales
Id. at 272. The PCM does not account for out-of-plant costs such as advertising, and so is only
a crude approximation to the Lerner index. Id. The PCM has the added advantage, however,
of reflecting the exact level of aggregation at which industry concentration ratios are pub-
lished. Id. See infra note 184 and accompanying text (discussing industry concentration
ratios).
184. There are many alternative measures of industry concentration, including N (the
number of firms in the industry), C (the concentration ratio, defined as the percentage of total
industry sales contributed by the largest few firms), and H (the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index,
defined as the sum of the square of the concentration ratios of the largest firms in the indus-
try). Each measure has advantages and disadvantages, although as a practical matter the four
firm concentration ratio C is most easily quantified. See F. SCHERER, supra note 51, at 56-64.
185. In general, two methods aid in measuring barriers to entry. Bain's pioneering ap-
proach required the grouping of barriers of entry into four headings: scale economies, product
differentiation (as reflected in the level of advertising), absolute cost and capital requirements.
See J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1962). As a means of measuring the heights of
these various barriers, Bain relied upon his own subjective analysis of the relevant industry and
categorized the barriers as either unimportant, moderately important, or very important.
An alternative approach, more commonly employed involves the use of statistical mea-
sures rather than subjective judgments. Comanor and Wilson, for example, focus on economies
for industrial goods, 186 and e is the statistical error. By estimating
equations similar to equation (1) using multiple regression tech-
niques, one may test the direction and extent of structural influences
on profits.
2. The Conventional Wisdom: Structure Influencing Profit-
ability.-Professor Joe S. Bain developed the seminal empirical test
of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm using a model simi-
lar to equation (1).187 In a study produced in 1951, Bain found a
significant and positive relation between the after-tax profit returns
on stockholder's equity of leading companies and industry concentra-
tion. 188 Since that time, other studies have reported statistical suc-
cess in relating various profit measures to concentration and entry
barrier proxies. 189 The results frequently indicate that concentration
has a significant positive influence. 90 At least some variables used as
proxies for entry barriers (particularly advertising intensity) also
usually prove significant.' 9' Thus, several influential scholars have
of scale, absolute capital requirements, and advertising, but adopt statistical proxies to mea-
sure their effects. Comanor and Wilson, Advertising, Market Structure and Performance, 49
REV. ECON. & STAT. 423 (1967). For economies of scale, the measure adopted by Comanor
and Wilson "is average plant size among the largest plants accounting for 50 percent of indus-
try output . . . divided by total output in the relevant market." Id. at 428. As a measure of
the absolute capital requirement, the authors multiplied an average output level figure by the
ratio of total assets to gross sales in the industry. As a measure of the advertising barrier,
Comanor and Wilson employed two techniques: advertising outlays per dollar sales and "aver-
age advertising expenditures per firm among firms which account for 50 percent of industry
output." Id.
186. Estimates of elasticities of demand for industrial goods are difficult to obtain. Many
economists therefore leave the elasticity variable out of the equation, and implicitly assume
that elasticity is random across industries. An alternative approach is to take the ratio of the
regression function at two points in time, and to assume "n" varies in the same way across
industries over this time period. See Cowling and Waterson, Price-Cost Margins and Market
Structure, 43 ECONOMICA 267 (1976). For a general discussion of the concept of elasticity of
demand, see supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
187. Bain, Relation of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration: American Manufactur-
ing, 1936-1940, 65 QUART. J. ECON. 293 (1951).
188. Id.
189. In a frequently cited survey, Weiss examined eighty-seven studies and found un-
mistakable support for the view that a positive association exists between seller concentration
and profitability. Weiss, The Concentration-Profits Relationship and Antitrust, in INDUSTRIAL
CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 229 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann, and J. Weston, eds.
1974); see also I. BOBEL, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1978) (reaching similar conclusions in
a survey of 100 concentration-profits studies, many of which used British, Canadian or West
German data). The Federal Reserve Board evaluated structure-performance studies in banking
and found evidence of a structure-performance relationship in 30 of 39 studies conducted from
1960 through September 1977, and in twenty-three of twenty-six studies conducted from Sep-
tember 1977 through June 1982. Rhoades, Structure-Performance Studies in Banking: An
Updated Summary and Evaluation, 68 FED. RES. BULL. 477 (1982). The Board's staff con-
cluded that "market structure does influence performance in banking." Id. at 478.
190. E.g., Weiss, supra note 189; Rhoades, supra note 189 (in sixty-five banking studies,
concentration ratio proved to be most frequently used and most successful measure of market
structure).
191. Pagoulatos & Sorenson, A Simultaneous Equation Analysis of Advertising, Con-
centration and Profitability, 47 S. ECON. J. 728-41 (1981).
concluded, as did Professor Scherer in 1980, that "rather robust"
support exists for concluding that there is a positive association be-
tween seller concentration, barriers to entry, and profitability. 9 '
Typical of traditional work testing the structure-conduct-per-
formance paradigm is one particularly comprehensive study by
Weiss.193 Analyzing 1963 data on 399 census industries, Weiss used
the ordinary least square (OLS) regression technique to estimate va-
rious equations with the price-cost margins expressed in percentage
terms. He found price-cost margins positively and significantly asso-
ciated with seller concentration, the ratio of capital to sales, the ratio
of advertising outlays to sales, past output growth, and a shift varia-
ble representing the product of the concentration ratio times the per-
centage of industry sales going to consumer goods markets. The
margin remained positive, but was significantly lower for one barrier
to entry variable, the ratio of midpoint plant sales to total industry
sales. Another barrier variable, the estimated amount of capital re-
quired by a midpoint plant, had an unexplained negative sign.194
3. Challenges to the Conventional Wisdom.-Despite the
widespread belief that there is a direct positive association between
seller concentration, barriers to entry, and profitability, an increasing
number of economists in recent years have challenged this conclu-
sion. While numerous statistical criticisms may be leveled, 195 those
which have recently garnered increased attention focus on simultane-
ous equation and specification problems.1 96 Apart from these meth-
odological criticisms, conventional interpretations of statistical re-
sults have been challenged as well.197
a. Simultaneous Equation Models.-An important problem
posed by single equation estimates of the sort used in traditional re-
search is that the causal link between variables is not necessarily
uni-directional. If some of the explanatory variables are jointly de-
termined along with profitability, then single equation estimation
will produce misleading results.
Strickland and Weiss undertook one of the earliest attempts to
account for the possibility of simultaneity. 19 8 They suggested a three-
192. See F. SCHERER, supra note 51, at 278-79.
193. Weiss, supra note 189.
194. Id.
195. For criticisms of the conventional methodology, see generally HAY & MORRIS, IN-
DUSTRIAL ECONOMIES: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 199-226 (1979); M. WATERSON, supra note 53,
at 190-210.
196. See infra notes 198-219 and accompanying text.
197. See infra notes 222-44 and accompanying text.
198. Strickland and Weiss, Advertising, Concentration and Price-Cost Margins, 84 J.
POL. EcON. 1109 (1976).
equation simultaneous equation model, under which advertising in-
tensity is determined by concentration, the price-cost margin and va-
rious exogenous variables; the level of concentration is determined by
technological factors and advertising intensity; and the margin is de-
termined by concentration, advertising intensity and the usual types
of barrier to entry proxies.19 This model, however, produced an im-
portant statistical problem. In essence, the third equation could not
be distinguished empirically from its linear combination with the
second equation, since it excluded no variable included in the latter.
Martin200 modified the Strickland and Weiss model to solve the
identification problem by introducing additional variables into the
second equation. Martin found that concentration and the price cost
margin were the most important determinants of advertising inten-
sity, at least for consumer goods. The most important influences on
the price cost margin were positive effects due to concentration, ad-
vertising intensity and the growth rate.
20 1
It appears, however, that the equations estimated in the Martin
study were misspecified with conflicting arguments used to generate
them. 01 Moreover, very recent simultaneous equation research has
produced results which conflict with the conventional wisdom.
Gupta 208 specified and estimated a simultaneous-equation model en-
dogenizing concentration, foreign ownership, advertising, sub-opti-
199. Id.
200. Martin, Advertising Concentration and Profitability: the Simultaneity Problem, 10
BELL J. 639 (1979).
201. Id.
202. Sawyer argues that Stickland, Weiss and Martin ought not to have included a
quadratic function of concentration and the profit margin in their advertising-sales ratio equa-
tion. Sawyer, On the Specification of Structure-Performance Relationships, 17 EUR. ECON.
REV. 295, 300-02 (1982). Compare Clarke, On the Specification of Structure-Performance
Relationships: A Comment, 23 EUR. ECON. REV. 253 (1983) (simultaneous equation studies
still provide useful insights when compared with single equation results), with Sawyer, On the
Specification of Structure-Performance Relationships: A Reply, 23 EUR. ECON. REv. 257
(1983) (Clarke's comparison of misspecified simultaneous- and single-equation estimates not
sound practice).
Sawyer also argues that independent variables in estimated equations are often chosen on
the basis of a literature search rather than on the basis of a coherent theoretical approach, a
criticism which applies to authors using both simultaneous and single-equation models. Saw-
yer, On the Specification of Structure-Performance Relationships, 17 EUR. ECON. Rav. 295,
305 (1982). Boothwell, Cooley and Hall refined and extended this argument, noting that all of
the empirical evidence is based on independent variables and projections of data that are heav-
ily conditioned by the prior beliefs of the researcher. Boothwell, Cooley and Hall, A New View
of the Market-Structure Performance Debate, 32 J. INDUS. ECON. 397 (1984). After re-
gressing equations using different independent variables, the authors conclude that specifica-
tion uncertainty plays a critical role in market-structure-performance studies. When this un-
certainty is accounted for, the data appear to be largely uninformative about the relationship
between concentration and profits. Id.; see also Cooley, Specification Analysis with Discrimi-
nating Priors: An Application to the Concentration Profits Debate, I ECONOMETRIC REV. 97
(1982).
203. Gupta, A Simultaneous Determination of Structure, Conduct and Performance in
Canadian Manufacturing, 35 OXFORD ECON. PAP. 281 (1983).
mal capacity, and profitability. The results raised doubts about the
reliability of the popular single-equation studies findings.114 For ex-
ample, Gupta found that foreign ownership exerted a downward
competitive influence on profitability and sub-optimal capacity in the
OLS results but not in the simultaneous-equation results, primarily
becuase of the upward impact of foreign ownership on advertising,
and of advertising on profitability and sub-optimal capacity." 5
Gupta concluded that "the hypothesis that concentration leads to
collusion is not supported," and that "some concentration levels are
essential for the sake of production efficiency. 20 6
b. The Critical Concentration Ratio.-Most traditional stud-
ies relating profitability to concentration and entry barriers assume
that the relationship with concentration changes smoothly. Some
economists, however, believe that concentration only has an impact
on performance once it rises above a certain level.207 Empirically, the
problem is to identify this point, assuming it is roughly constant
across industries.
The approach adopted by White 20 typifies models designed to
test for the critical concentration ratio. White prepared two equa-
tions which were roughly similar to traditional models, except that
concentration had an influence only by giving a discrete jump in the
intercept.20 9 White found that his models yielded an optimal split at
a four-firm concentration ratio of about fifty-seven percent.
210
Most recent studies of the critical concentration ratio confirm
White's results. These studies show a distinct upsurge in profit rates
as the four-firm concentration ratio passes through a range some-
where between forty-five and fifty-nine percent.2 1
204. Id. at 296.
205. Id. at 295.
206. Id. at 297.
207. See F. SCHERER, supra note 51, at 280 & n.48.
208. White, Searching for the Critical Concentration Ratio, in STUDIES IN NONLINEAR
ESTIMATION 61 (S. Goldfeld and R. Quandt, eds. 1976).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. For a review of studies finding a critical concentration ratio, see F. SCHERER, supra
note 5I, at 280-81 & n.48 (citing Dalton & Penn, The Concentration-Profitability Relation-
ship: Is There a Critical Concentration Ratio?, 25 J. INDUS. ECON. 133 (1976); Meehan and
Duchesneau, The Critical Level of Concentration, 22 J. INDUS. EcON. 21 (1973)).
Important contrary findings are presented in Geithman, Marvel and Weiss, Concentra-
tion, Price, and Critical Concentration Ratios, 63 REV. ECON. & STAT. 346 (1981). In regres-
sions using data from the retail gasoline industry, the authors found a four firm critical con-
centration ratio of 50%. In regressions employing supermarket data, the study showed no sign
of a critical concentration at all. Id. at 352. The results suggest that the theoretical justifica-
tion for a constant critical value across industries is weak, and cast doubt upon the critical
value empirically as well.
For other recent work on the critical concentration ratio, see Bradburd and Over, Organi-
zational Costs, Sticky Equilibria and Critical Levels of Concentration, 54 REv. ECON. &
c. The Rivalry Hypothesis.-The rivalry hypothesis relates
closely to the critical concentration school. Kwoka212 notes that the
lack of individual market share data forces the use of the simple sum
of the four (or eight) largest shares, i.e., the concentration ratio, as
the variable representing the size of the firm. Nothing in theory,
however, predicts that exactly four firms are crucial to industry per-
formance, and nothing implies that they are equally important, as is
implicit in their simple summation.213 Employing newly compiled in-
dividual market share data, Kwoka was able to disaggregate the
traditional measure of firm size distribution, and to test the exact
number, relative importance, and necessary size of the largest firm in
determining industry performance." 4 Kwoka observed a significant
jump in price-cost margins when the two-firm concentration ratio
crosses a thirty-five percent threshold.21  Kwoka found that a suffi-
ciently large third firm causes industry margins to fall by thirteen or
fourteen percentage points, wiping out the above-competition mar-
gins secured by the large leading firms. Rough equality of size
among three firms appeared to breed rivalry capable of simulating
competitive performance levels.
21 6
Kwoka's findings, if correct, have significant theoretical and pol-
icy implications. If performance is the same in concentrated indus-
tries where the three leading firms hold equal shares, as in unconcen-
trated industries, then most traditional theories of oligopoly have
been repudiated, because such findings undermine the concept of in-
terdependence or collusion among rivals. Indeed, Kwoka's findings
suggest that even triopolists in highly concentrated industries may
perform competitively.
21 7
Not surprisingly, Kwoka's pioneering study has provoked con-
siderable comment. Some commentators assert that statistical biases
may have influenced the results.218 Others contend that Kwoka ig-
nored the possibility that a group of firms below the top two, as op-
STAT. 50 (1982) which suggests that the critical concentration ratio may differ depending on
whether concentration is rising or falling.
212. Kwoka, The Effect of Market Share Distribution on Industry Performance, 61
REV. ECON. & STAT. 101 (1979).
213. Id. at 101.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 107.
216. Id.
217. The implications of Kwoka's findings for enforcing Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
see supra note 2, are equally profound. The findings suggest that not only should mergers by
the third largest firms in highly concentrated industries be tolerated, they should be en-
couraged, because a stronger third firm could compete more effectively with its larger rivals.
218. Scherer argues that "even when industries' price-raising propensities depend upon
the four-firm concentration ratio alone, the confounding of price-raising and scale economies
effects in industry cross-section studies leads to higher observed correlations for two-firm than
four-firm concentration ratios." F. SCHERER, supra note 51, at 281 n.48.
posed to merely the third firm, provided greater competitive po-
tency.2"9 Recently, however, four additional tests of the rivalry
hypothesis confirmed Kwoka's findings. Three studies confirmed the
rivalry phenomenon, though they differ in the important detail as to
which firm is the strong rival.220 One study failed to find rivalry
among the top three firms, without testing for rivalry when four
firms are large.22'
d. The Efficiency Argument.-Traditional studies generally
have assumed that the higher average profitability observed for con-
centrated industries comes from the power to elevate prices that mo-
nopoly confers.222 There is, however, an alternative hypothesis: that
the relationships reflect lower costs which result from the superior
efficiency of large sellers. 223 Demsetz224 and others225 suggest that,
rather than concentration/market power leading to higher prices and
profits, the causal direction in fact runs from greater efficiency to
both higher profits and, incidentally, to higher concentration.
Empirical tests designed to study the Demsetz efficiency argu-
ment are relatively easy to specify. If the traditional market concen-
tration doctrine is correct, an industry structure that facilitates the
219. Mueller and Greer, The Effect of Market Share Distribution on Industry Perform-
ance Reexamined, 66 REV. ECON. & STAT. 353, 355 (1984). In response to this criticism,
Kwoka argues that there is no theoretical or intuitive basis for supposing that the key firms in
industry performance are the first, second, and fourth - simply skipping the third. Kwoka,
The Effect of Market Share Distribution on Industry Performance: A Reply, 66 REV. ECON.
& STAT. 358 (1984) [hereinafter cited as A Reply]. Moreover, the empirical results suggest
that the "most that can be said is that the fourth firm may be weakly complementing rivalry
by the third, but even here the coefficients differ by more than 25%." Id. at 359.
220. See A Reply, supra note 219, at 359 (citing Kwoka and Ravenscraft, Collusion,
Rivalry, Scale Economies, and Line of Business Profitability, FTC Line of Business Program
Working Paper (Mar. 1983) (finding that profitability of the leading line of business is re-
duced by larger second firms in many industries, and by larger third firms in the two-digit
industry Food and Kindred Products); Lecraw, Performance of Transnational Corporations in
Less Developed Countries, 14 J. INT'L Bus. STUDIES 15 (1983) (reports higher profitability
from larger shares of the top two firms, and lower profitability from the third, all effects statis-
tically significant); Lamm, Prices and Concentration in the Food Industry, 30 J. INDuS. ECON.
67 (1981) (exploring retail food price determination in 18 SMSA's, and finding positive and
significant effects from the top three shares, with statistically significant rivalry from the
fourth leading firm)).
221. See A Reply, supra note 219, at 359 (citing D. LEAN, J. OGUR. AND R. ROGERS,
COMPETITION AND COLLUSION IN ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT MARKETS: AN ECONOMIC ASSESS-
MENT (FTC, July 1982) (study of electrical equipment manufacturers reports positive effect
from third firm in these intermittently collusive product markets, but data limitations preclude
tests of fourth or smaller firms)).
222. See F. SCHERER, supra note 51, at 280.
223. Id.
224. Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry and Public Policy, 16 J.L. & EcON.
1 (1973).
225. Williamson, Economies As An Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Trade-Offs, 58 AM.
ECON. REV. 18 (1968); J. McGEE, IN DEFENSE OF INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION (1971); see
also infra notes 227-32 and accompanying text; infra notes 246-82 and accompanying text
(discussing the implications of efficiency analysis).
exercise of monopoly power should benefit all firms equally, and lit-
tle or no difference in the profitability of different sized firms within
the industry should occur. If the efficiency explanation is correct, the
realization of scale economies should produce a positive relation
within an industry between relative firm size, as reflected by market
share, and profitability.
226
Empirical work by Demsetz, 227 Peltzman 22' and others229 tends
to support the efficiency hypothesis. Carter,230 for example, regresses
the price-cost margin for the largest four firms on industry concen-
trations, advertising intensity and capital intensity, and finds all vari-
ables significant. 231 When he regresses the price-cost margin for the
fifth to eighth firms on the same industry magnitudes, concentration
is no longer significant.3 2 These results are consistent with the effi-
ciency interpretation.
Others have criticized Carter-type tests of the efficiency hypoth-
esis. Clarke, Davies and Waterson, 233 for example, consider a simple
homogeneous product model and substitute into their equation a sub-
stitute definition of a collusion variable. Pursuant to this model, it
can be demonstrated that larger firms would have larger price-cost
margins even if the collusion parameter were almost unity.23 4 More-
over, Marcus235 has shown that the averaging of results in Demsetz-
type tests conceals the fact that in some U.S. industries profitability
actually falls with firm size.
Porter 236 too questions the Demsetz efficiency hypothesis and
has developed the concept of barriers to mobility. Porter asserts that
226. See F. SCHERER, supra note 51, at 280-81; Clarke, Davies and Waterson, The
Profitability-Concentration Relation: Market Power or Efficiency?, 32 J. INDUS. ECON. 435,
437 (1984).
227. See Demsetz, supra note 224 (finding profitability is positively and significantly
associated with concentration only for the largest firms in the sample of industries).
228. Peltzman, The Gains and Losses from Industrial Concentration, 20 J.L. & ECON.
229 (1977). In an attempt to create a model more fully structured than Demsetz's, Peltzman
developed a model which simultaneously explains the development of concentration and profit-
ability. Id. The mechanism is that some firms, presumably the more efficient, adopt cost-reduc-
ing innovations more swiftly, then find greater outputs optimal as a result of their lower costs,
thus leading to increased concentration. Id. Peltzman formulated a very complex model along
these lines and obtained seeming empirical verification. Id. The model is so complex, however,
that it is difficult to isolate the various effects, and it has been argued that as a matter of fact
most recent concentration increases in the U.S. have not come about by the mechanism
Peltzman suggested. See F. SCHERER, supra note 51, at 289-90.
229. See infra notes 230, 241-44 and accompanying text.
230. Carter, Collusion, Efficiency and Antitrust, 21 J.L. & ECON. 435 (1978).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Clarke, Davies and Waterson, The Profitability-Concentration Relation: Market
Power or Efficiency?, 32 J. INDUs. Eco N. 435 (1984).
234. Id. at 439.
235. See Marcus, Profitability and Size of Firm, 51 REv. ECON. & STAT. 104 (1969).
236. Porter, The Structure Within Industries and Companies' Performance, 61 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 214 (1979).
individual industries are made up of groups of firms that face very
different market positions. For example, some groups of firms may
advertise branded products, and others may advertise generic items.
Porter admits that variable traits within the industry such as differ-
ences in the scale of firms, the costs of mobility between groups and
the abilities of managements all will create efficiency differences.
Porter asserts, however, that there also will be industry-wide traits of
market structure that determine average profitability. To the extent
that Porter's approach incorporates both efficiency and structure
considerations, his approach is contrary to the pure efficiency view
that inter- and intra-industry structural elements are unimportant in
determining intra-industry profitability differences. Empirical re-
search by Porter287 and by Allen2 38 purportedly supports this barrier
to mobility thesis.
Most recent studies, however, tend to support the efficiency hy-
pothesis. Indeed, the availability of new, detailed United States data
sets, particularly the Profit Impact of Market Strategy (PIMS)
data2 39 and the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC's) Line of Busi-
ness data 2 40 have allowed researchers to avoid the statistical com-
plexities of past research and to conclude anew that there is indeed
strong support for the efficiency hypothesis. Using the PIMS data,
for example, Gale and Branch241 were able to enter both market
share and concentration as independent variables in a straightfor-
ward test of the relative explanatory power of each. The results lead
the authors to conclude that market share, not concentration, is the
primary structural determinant of profitability, and that, therefore,
scale economies are far more powerful than oligopoly power in deter-
237. Id.
238. Allen, Efficiency, Market Power, and Profitability in American Manufacturing, 49
S. ECON. J. 933 (1983). Allen developed a new measure of market power that proxies the
strategic group concentration within the oligopoly core and concluded that "market power [is]
the dominant influence in the concentration-profits relationship." Id. at 939. Allen defined his
measure of collusive ability as the ratio of the value of shipments of the four largest firms in
the industry to the value of shipments of the eight largest firms, a measure equivalent to the
ratio of the four-firm concentration ratio to the eight-firm concentration ratio. Id. at 935.
Coate has argued, however, that the Allen variable is a poor measure of market power because
it has no strong theoretical link to the size distribution of the firms in the industry; its specifi-
cation tends to omit the concentration effect in some industries. Coate, Efficiency, Market
Power and Profitability in American Manufacturing: Comment, 51 S. EcON. J. 274 (1984).
Allen argues in reply that his strategic group index was intended only to attempt to capture
the degree of inequality between two strategic groups. "These groups are presumed to differ
with respect to price differences and other dimensions of market rivalry. The more equal in
size are the two groups the more strategic asymmetry enhances industry rivalry.". Allen, Effi-
ciency, Market Power and Profitability in American Manufacturing: Reply, 51 S. ECON. J.
274 (1984).
239. See F. SCHERER, supra note 51, at 271.
240. Id.
241. Gale & Branch, Concentration Versus Market Share: Which Determines Perform-
ance and Why Does It Matter?, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 83 (1982).
mining profit levels. 2' 2 Other recent studies using firm-level data
sets, such as those by Coate 3 and Ravenscraft, 2 " similarly find that
concentration is insignificant in explaining profitability. Thus, public




A. The Goals of Antitrust Enforcement
Debate on whether statistical studies show a correlation between
profits and concentration doubtless will continue for years. Simulta-
neous equation analysis, as well as tests of the critical concentration
ratio and rivalry hypothesis, likely will be the focus of future
research.
Even if a positive correlation between concentration and profit-
ability ultimately is established, however, such a finding arguably
would be utterly ambiguous and would have no implications for pub-
lic policy. As Demsetz and the most recent research suggest, a posi-
tive correlation between concentration and profitability could be the
result of superior efficiency rather than superior ability to restrict
output.2 48 This, then, raises a fundamental threshold question: what
are the goals of antitrust enforcement?
The view implicit in Demsetz's work, and that expressly enunci-
ated by those adopting the "Chicago School" approach, is that the
antitrust laws should be construed to promote one predominant goal:
"economic efficiency" as defined by neo-classical price theory.24
Pursuant to this view, the above-average returns of the most efficient
firms in an industry do not indicate monopoly. 4 8 Rather, as Yale
Brozen explains, "[I]f the leading firm in a concentrated industry is
more profitable than most other firms in the industry, this indicates
242. Id.
243. Coate, "Market Share and Profitability: A New Approach," (Working paper 79,
FTC 1982), cited in A Reply, supra note 219.
244. Ravenscraft, Structure-Profit Relationships at the Line of Business and Industry
Level, 65 REV. ECON. & STAT. 22 (1984).
245. See supra notes 241-44 and accompanying text. Compare Benston, The Validity of
Profits-Structure Studies in the Particular Reference to the FTC's Line of Business Data, 75
AM. ECON. REV. 37, 59-60 (1985). Benston argues that studies based on the FTC's line of
business data are of doubtful value in economic analysis because the reported numbers, derived
from the companies' accounting systems, do not properly reflect economic market values.
246. See supra notes 222-45 and accompanying text.
247. E.g., R. BORK, supra note 168, at 59-89; R. POSNER, supra note 168, at 8-35;
Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 TEx. L. REV. 705, 706-08 (1982).
248. Brozen, The Concentration-Collusion Doctrine, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION
AND THE MARKET SYSTEM 90, 125 (E. Fox & J. Halverson, eds. 1979); Report of the Attorney
General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws at 325 (March 31, 1955) ("Thb
constant . . . pressure of competition to drive rates of profits throughout the economy towards
minimum levels is consistent with continuingly high rates of return for firms with better-than-
average location, resources, efficiency or rate of innovation.").
that it is behaving competitively. Its industry is concentrated because
it has turned in a superior performance and consumers of the prod-
uct are benefiting from the superior performance. ' 24 9 Brozen notes
that when concentration rules, some studies indicate that costs and
prices are in fact lower than they would be if the market had been
prevented from becoming concentrated.2 50 This, he contends, is per-
fectly consistent with theory, since any firm winning a large share of
the market in competition with others must be offering attractive
prices.2 51 Breaking up such a firm or exposing it to treble damages,
therefore, is inconsistent with the goal of the antitrust laws - the
promotion of consumer welfare through economic efficiency - since
it would penalize firms that increase their business to a size where
scale economies enable them to reduce prices.252
An alternative view concerning the goals of antitrust enforce-
ment is provided by proponents of the "Harvard School." These the-
orists argue that economic efficiency is not the only goal that the
antitrust laws were designed to promote. Congress also designed the
antitrust laws to preserve a deconcentrated industrial structure, to
disperse economic power, to encourage local ownership of business
and to lessen inequalities in economic conditions. 53 If these addi-
tional purposes are served, antitrust policies that produce a net de-
crease in consumer welfare may nevertheless be justified.
The intellectual debate concerning the goal of antitrust enforce-
ment is apt to continue for some time, and certainly it would be
improper to suggest that one view has triumphed over the other. It
does appear, however, that the trend in recent Supreme Court analy-
sis has been to place increasing weight on efficiency considera-
tions.254 In Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,25 for example, the Court
unanimously concluded that "Congress designed the Sherman Act as
a 'consumer welfare prescription.' "256 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court cited with approval Robert Bork's The Antitrust Paradox,
249. Brozen, supra note 248, at 125.
250. Id. at 91. See also S. LUSTGARTEN, INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION AND INFLATION
(1975) (productivity rises more rapidly and prices more slowly in concentrated than in uncon-
centrated industries); Thompson, Absolute Firm Size, Administered Prices, and Inflation: An
Exploratory Analysis, 12 ECON. INQUIRY 240 (1974).
251. Brozen, supra note 248, at 93.
252. Id.
253. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 35 at 1-13; Spivack, Monopolization Under Sherman
Act, Section 2, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 285, 304-07 (1982); Schwartz, "Justice" and Other Non-
Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076 (1979); Scherer, Book Review, The
Posnerian Harvest: Separating Wheat from Chaff, 86 YALE L.J. 974 (1977).
254. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 7-10, 19-20
(1979); Continental T.V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977); United
States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enter., 429 U.S. 610 (1977); United States v. General Dynamics
Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974):
255. 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
256. Id. at 343.
a classic exposition of the Chicago School approach.257 Indeed, a
number of commentators have concluded that the Supreme Court
now has adopted a predominantly economic approach to antitrust
law,258 and Judge Posner has so ruled in three recent opinions. 59
The Department of Justice similarly has adopted an approach
that places increased emphasis on efficiency considerations. The De-
partment's Merger Guidelines and, most recently, the Vertical Re-
straint Guidelines each contain specific sections devoted to analysis
of the efficiency effects of particular conduct. 260 The Department has
indicated that it will not challenge many mergers or vertical re-
straints which have significant procompetitive effects.2" 1
Finally, even some Harvard School commentators are devoting
increased attention to efficiency effects. Areeda and Turner, for ex-
ample, although generally associated with the Harvard School, nev-
ertheless have advocated that the per se approach to vertical price
fixing be abandoned in favor of a cautious rule of reason analysis.26 2
This does not, of course, amount to an outright acceptance of the
Chicago School approach. Some Chicago School theorists, such as
Professors Bork and Posner, argue that vertical restraints should be
completely lawful. 2 a The Areeda and Turner approach does, how-
ever, evidence concern among Harvard School theorists for promot-
ing efficiency, even if that means denying smaller competitors the
opportunity to compete. As one respected author recently has con-
cluded, the Harvard School now "agrees that the major goals of the
antitrust laws relate to economic efficiency. "264
B. The Implications of Efficiency Analysis
If efficiency considerations receive increased emphasis, what are
257. Id. (citing R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978)).
258. See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND
OTHER MATERIALS 855-57 (2d ed. 1981); Baxter, Responding to the Reaction: The Drafts-
man's View, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 618, 619-21 (1983).
259. Marrese v. Amer. Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 706 F.2d 1488, 1495-97 (7th
Cir. 1983), vacated and aFfd on rehearing en banc on other grounds, 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir.
1984); rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 1327 (1985); Products Liability Ins. Co. v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co.,
682 F.2d 660, 663-64 (7th Cir. 1982); Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678
F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982).
260. U.S. Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines, reprinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1069, at S-1, (June 17, 1982); U.S. Department of Justice, Vertical
Restraints Guidelines, reprinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1199 (Sp.
Supp.), at I (January 24, 1985).
261. See supra note 260.
262. See generally Posner, Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U.
PA. L. REV. 925, 926 (1979) (noting that the intellectual turmoil over vertical price fixing long
predates the advent of the Chicago school).
263. Halverson, An Overview of the Legal and Economic Issues Regarding Vertical Ar-
rangements, in ANTITRUST POLICY IN TRANSITION: THE CONVERGENCE OF LAW AND ECO-
NOMICS 366 (E. Fox and J. Halverson, eds. 1984).
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the implications for analysis under Section 2 of the Sherman Act?
The most obvious conclusion is that the conventional use of concen-
tration and entry barrier evidence to support the inference of monop-
oly power may be seriously misguided.
1. Concentration and Efficiency.-It is clear from the above
discussion that concentration and high profits may not necessarily
suggest the ability to control prices. Indeed, most recent studies have
found that market share, not market concentration, is the primary
determinant of profitability. This finding in turn implies that scale
economies, not collusion or shared monopoly, is the major determi-
nant of profit levels.265 This is not to suggest that market share is no
reflection of the ability to control price; the Supreme Court has
stated that monopoly power ordinarily may be inferred from a mar-
ket share exceeding approximately seventy-five percent.266 Efficiency
analysis does suggest, however, that it is incorrect to argue that ris-
ing concentration, even at very low levels, is a danger against which
action should be taken.26 7 Rather, as Yale Brozen explains, instead
of being condemned as a trend toward monopoly, rising concentra-
tion by internal growth "should be praised as a demonstration of the
competitiveness of the markets in which it occurs. '"268
2. Barriers to Entry.-The conventional analysis of entry bar-
riers may be similarly misguided. If everything that makes entry
more difficult is viewed as a barrier, and if barriers are bad, then
efficiency is an evil. This conclusion is inconsistent with consumer
oriented policy.269 The question for antitrust enforcement, as Profes-
sor Bork has so clearly articulated, is whether there exist "artificial"
entry barriers, or barriers that are not a form of superior effi-
ciency.' If the goal of antitrust enforcement is to promote effi-
ciency, only those barriers to entry that are not the product of effi-
ciency should be condemned. 27
1
It appears, however, that most traditional barriers to entry are
at least in part the product of efficiencies. Most notably, economies
265. See supra notes 239-44 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
267. Brozen, supra note 248, at 94.
268. Id. at 94-95; see also United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 118 F.
Supp. 41, 208 (D. Del. 1953), affd on other grounds, 351 U.S. 377 (1956) ("Years of profit
do not establish monopoly power over prices. They establish this: duPont was an efficient busi-
ness company. Monopoly cases do not rest on such insubstantial evidence to support complete
power over price."); see also supra note 76 (discussing requirement that the monopolist have
the ability to control price over the long term).
269. R. BORK, supra note 168, at 195.
270. Id. at 311.
271. Id.
of scale are a form of efficiency. 72 Economies of scale may be real-
ized, for example, when a firm erects a plant of the most efficient
size. To condemn such conduct would be to contravene the central
purpose of the antitrust laws - the promotion of consumer welfare.
Indeed, even some Harvard School commentators acknowledge that
"it is not helpful, and may even be misleading" to call scale econo-
mies and competitive performance a "barrier to entry. 2173
Other factors traditionally regarded as barriers to entry -
physical product differentiation, advertising and promotion, and cap-
ital requirements - may also be the product of efficiencies.274 Bork
notes, for example, that an incumbent firm's product differentiation
can make another firm's entry into the market difficult only if con-
sumers prefer the incumbent's version of the product, a result that is
consistent with the goal of promoting consumer welfare.27 5 Similarly,
capital requirements exist and may inhibit entry "just as talent re-
quirements for playing professional football exist and inhibit entry,"
but "neither barrier is in any sense artificial or the proper subject of
special concern for antitrust policy.
176
This is not to suggest that there are no true "artificial" barriers
which properly are the subject of antitrust concern. Professor Bork,
for example, identifies several such barriers, including boycotts and
predation through governmental processes, which are instances of
deliberate predation and are not the result of efficiencies.27 7 Argua-
bly, some traditional barriers may in fact possess "artificial" aspects.
Areeda and Turner, for example, agree with Bork that the mere fact
that entry requires a large absolute expenditure of funds does not
constitute a barrier to entry.278 They argue, however, that capital
requirements may be true barriers to the extent that they force new
entrants to accept higher risks and hence to pay more than estab-
lished firms to attract investor funds.
279
Even the Areeda and Turner analysis indicates, however, that
given increased concern for efficiency, the use of traditional entry
barrier analysis to support the inference of monopoly power should
be discouraged. Many factors have been said to be monopolistic bar-
riers to entry, including scale economies, advertising, patents, verti-
cal integration, and capital requirements.280 Each of these may make
272. Id.
273. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 23, 409b, at 300.
274. R. BORK, supra note 168, at 310-29.
275. Id. at 312-14.
276. Id. at 320.
277. Id.
278. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 23, 409c, at 303.
279. Id.
280. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
it harder for potential competitors to enter a market, but each may
also create efficiencies. 28' The concept of "barriers to entry" is a use-
ful part of antitrust analysis only if we can identify barriers which
are not the result of efficiency. 82 Because traditional barriers are at
least in part a result of efficiency, only artificial barriers, usually re-
sulting from acts of deliberate predation, may confidently be used to
support the inference of monopoly power. 83
C. Completed Monopolization: Suggested Guidelines
If concentration and most entry barrier evidence is disfavored,
then how is monopoly power to be determined? Clearly, no definitive
general rule can be established to answer this question. The courts as
fact finders must have latitude to depart from strict adherence to
precise tests. Suggested guidelines, however, are an important and
useful tool for legal analysis, and in this regard the following general
proposition seems appropriate. It is reasonable to presume the exis-
tence of monopoly power when the following evidence has been
presented: that defendant's share of a properly defined market ex-
ceeds seventy-five percent at the time of the complaint and has ex-
ceeded seventy-five percent for the five years preceding the com-
plaint.2 8' The inference of monopoly power need not be
automatically drawn, however, and evidence of high demand or sup-
ply elasticities may show that monopoly power does not exist despite
a large market share.
285
The most obvious objection to this approach, which rejects the
use of barrier to entry evidence of monopoly power, is that in the
interpretation of any statute, stare decisis considerations are entitled
to substantial weight. 88 In Columbia Steel, the Supreme Court indi-
281. See supra notes 272-76 and accompanying text; see also E. SULLIVAN & H.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, at 467.
282. See supra note 281.
283. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
284. These guidelines follow in part the guidelines suggested by Areeda and Turner. See
3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 24, 1 803, at 291. Areeda and Turner argue that it is
reasonable to presume the existence of monopoly power when the following structural and
performance evidence has been demonstrated:
(I) Structure: Defendant's share of a properly defined market has exceeded
75 percent for the five years preceding the complaint.
(11) Performance during the same period: (A) Defendant's prices have typi-
cally exceeded average variable costs by 50 percent or more; or (B) Defendant's
return on investment has exceeded costs of capital by 50 percent or more.
Id. Among the possible ways of overcoming the presumption of monopoly power, Areeda and
Turner note two rebuttals: (1) Both market share and price-cost margins or return on invest-
ment have been steadily and substantially declining. (II) Marginal cost has substantially ex-
ceeded average variable cost. Id.
285. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text (describing market power as a func-
tion of market share, demand elasticity, and supply elasticity).
286. E.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 354 (1982); Bur-
net v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
cated that the relative effect of percentage command of a market
varies with the setting in which that factor is placed.2 87 In United
Shoe, the Court explicitly relied not only upon market share, but
also upon entry barrier evidence, to support the inference of monop-
oly power.2 88 Lower courts not only have affirmed monopolization ac-
tions against firms possessing less then seventy-five percent of the
market,2 89 but also have stated that even a fifty percent market share
is not a prerequisite to a finding of monopoly power. 9
The concern for stare decisis is a potent criticism of Chicago
School analysis, particularly in areas such as refusals to deal and tie-
ins, when making such practices lawful would require the express
overruling of several Supreme Court decisions.29' In the context of
the guidelines presented here, however, no such overruling of past
Supreme Court precedent is required. A seventy-five percent market
share is a reasonable benchmark requirement because Judge Hand's
famous 30-60-90 rule seems to suggest that a market share in excess
of sixty percent is a prerequisite to a finding of monopoly power.9
Moreover, after reviewing the relevant Supreme Court precedent,
former Assistant Attorney General Donald Turner testified that
"Section 2 . ..has never been found to cover a monopoly in an
industry in which the leading firm accounts for less than 70 percent
of the market. ' 293 True, the Supreme Court in Columbia Steel
stated that the relative effect of percentage command of a market
varies with the setting in which it is placed.294 This statement, how-
ever, is not necessarily inconsistent with the guidelines suggested by
this article. As one court explained in reconciling Judge Hand's ap-
proach with the Columbia Steel decision:
If a percentage control of the market is viewed, not as a short
cut to decision, but rather as a short-hand expression of power
when evaluating resources, trade, and the nature of the market,
it can be said that Columbia Steel is not inconsistent with the
287. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948); see supra notes 108-09
(discussing Columbia Steel).
288. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953),
affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); see supra notes 54-59, 110-11 and accompanying text
(discussing United Shoe).
289. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
291. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377-78 (1973)
(refusal to deal illegal); Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (tie-in illegal).
292. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Amer. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir.
1945); see supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (discussing Alcoa).
293. Status and Future of Small Business, 1967: Hearings Before the Senate Select
Comm. on Small Business, 90th Cong. Ist Sess. 714 (1967), quoted in Dimmitt Agri Indus.,
Inc. v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 679 F.2d 516, 528 n.1 I (5th Cir, 1982).
294. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 527-28 & n.25 (1948); see
supra note 108 (discussing Columbia Steel).
summary guide announced by Judge Hand.2 95
Indeed, although the Court in United Shoe addressed market struc-
ture and barriers to entry while considering market shares of less
than fifty percent, 296 presumably it did so only because the decision
was issued prior to the holding in Grinnell that monopoly power
could be inferred from market share alone.
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The guidelines presented by this article also are consistent with
the majority of lower court decisions, although some conflict can be
identified. For example, pursuant to the guidelines suggested here,
market shares of less than sixty percent ought not, as some courts
suggest, support a finding of monopoly power.299 Similarly, defen-
dants moving for summary judgment in completed monopolization
cases should not, as some courts suggest, bear the burden of demon-
strating the absence of barrier to entry or other evidence of monop-
oly power when there is undisputed evidence that defendant pos-
sesses a market share below fifty percent. 299 Despite these apparent
conflicts with some lower court decisions, however, the guidelines
suggested here are consistent with the majority of lower court
295. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Amer., 91 F. Supp. 333, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1950)
(the Alcoa remand).
296. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
297. See E. KINTNER, supra note 44, § 12.8, at 357-58 n.252.
298. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which a finding
of monopolization was upheld despite undisputed evidence that defendant possessed a market
share at or below 60%).
299. Summary judgment is drastic relief and must be approached cautiously, especially
in antitrust cases. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962). Sum-
mary judgment should be entered only if, when viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, it appears that "there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
However, the adverse party "may not rest upon the allegations or denials of his pleading"
when a motion for summary judgment is "supported as provided in this rule." FED. R. Civ. P.
56(3). Thus, the Supreme court has recognized that an antitrust litigant should not be entitled
to a trial on the merits absent "significant probative evidence" tending to support a valid com-
plaint. First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 389-90 (1968); see also
Transource Int'l v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 725 F.2d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1984). When there is
undisputed evidence that defendant's market share is less than approximately sixty percent, a
grant of summary judgment for defendant not only is consistent with the view that a market
share approaching seventy percent is a prerequisite for a finding of monopolization, see supra
notes 79-85 and accompanying text, but also is consistent with public policy considerations
underlying the administration of the antitrust laws. The National Commission for the Review
of Antitrust Laws and Procedures has reported that "[oin average, antitrust cases take longer
to litigate than other civil litigation; . . . absorb enormous resources and time; and . . . undue
delay is a serious problem in a significant number of complex antitrust cases." Report of the
National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures, 80 F.R.D. 509, 521
(1979). Indeed, the statutory remedy of treble damages for private antitrust plaintiffs also
"creates a special temptation for the institution of vexatious litigation" against which the
availability of summary judgment is an important check. Id. But see notes 126-35 and accom-
panying text (describing case law holding that defendants have the burden of demonstrating
the lack of structural or other evidence of monopoly power, even when defendant's market
share is below 50%).
cases. 311 Moreover, the fact that there exists some conflict between
the holdings of particular lower courts is not persuasive evidence that
the approach enunciated here should be rejected. It suggests rather
that the Supreme Court ought to resolve the conflict in the circuits
in light of the efficiency evidence herein presented.
D. Attempted Monopolization: Suggested Guidelines
With respect to the attempted monopolization offense, it first
should be emphasized that in only a minority of decisions have
courts held that proof of the traditional elements of a Section 2 case
is unnecessary. 0 1 The vast majority of courts in other circuits not
only have rejected plaintiffs' efforts to define the relevant market in
terms of a single product, 3 2 but also have viewed a dangerous
probability of monopolization as an essential element of the at-
tempted monopolization offense.303 Indeed, as one author recently
concluded, "[alnalytically, it makes little sense to formulate a rule
that an attempt-to-monopolize case can be made out where the con-
duct in question, even if successful, would not produce that degree of
market power which would constitute a monopoly.
' 304
If a dangerous probability of monopolization is required for at-
tempted monopolization, it is reasonable to use the completed mo-
nopolization guidelines presented above as a model for the attempt
offense. If monopoly power is inferable from a firm's large share of a
relevant market, it is natural to define a dangerous probability of
monopoly power in terms of a proximately reduced market share.30 5
One suggested approach would presume a dangerous probability of
monopolization when evidence has been presented that defendant's
share of a properly defined market exceeds fifty percent, 306 and is
increasing.
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Of the two primary objections to these suggested guidelines, the
first relates to stare decisis. Some lower courts have upheld at-
300. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
304. Martin, supra note 151, at 417. Eliminating the requirement of a dangerous
probability of monopolization in attempt cases "presents conceptual difficulties because crimi-
nal attempts have historically been associated with conduct directed at achieving an unlawful
result but falling somewhat short of accomplishment of the intended objective." ANTITRUST
LAWS, supra note 46, at 387.
305. Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary Answer to the
Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72 Micti. L. REV. 373 (1974).
306. For case law and commentary supporting this approximate market share require-
ment, see supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
307. Diamond Int'l Corp. v. Walterhoefer, 289 F. Supp. 550 (D. Md. 1968) (no danger-
ous probability of monopolization where there was a decline in market share from 52% to 51%
over the conduct period).
tempted monopolization actions against defendants with only twenty
percent market shares,3"8 and one court has indicated that even a
five percent share allegation is sufficient to avoid a motion for sum-
mary judgment.30 9 The second criticism relates to the goals of anti-
trust enforcement. The dangerous probability requirement can be
criticized on the ground that it permits a competitor with little mar-
ket power, or one not on the verge of attaining monopoly power, to
engage in predatory or exclusionary practices without fear of
liability.
Both of these criticisms, however, are unfounded. The Supreme
Court and the vast majority of lower courts view a dangerous
probability of monopolization as an essential element of the attempt
case.310 If the zone of dangerous probability may be encountered
with a market share as low as five to twenty percent, the require-
ment no longer is of a probability of attaining monopoly power, in
contravention of established precedent.311 Moreover, to require that
a dangerous probability of monopolization be proved in an attempt
case is not to suggest that all predatory or exclusionary practices by
firms with small market shares must be condoned. A large number
of both federal and state statutes are directed against predatory and
exclusionary practices,312  including the Automobile Dealer's
Franchise Act, 313 which makes it unlawful for a manufacturer to fail
to act in "good faith" concerning its dealers, and the Federal Trade
Commission Act,314 which makes unlawful unfair methods of compe-
tition and unfair or deceptive acts and practices.31 5 Undesirable con-
duct in vertical relationships should be remedied not by broadening
Section 2, but by using the plethora of federal and state statutes that
regulate vertical conduct and that attest to the existing substantial
degree of protection.3 16
V. Conclusion
A demonstration of monopoly power, or a dangerous probability
308. See supra note 145.
309. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
311. Cooper, supra note 305, at 387.
312. See id. at 418-19 (listing various statutes governing predatory and exclusionary
conduct).
313. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1982).
314. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982).
315. In addition to the Federal FTC Act, many states now have similar legislation
prohibiting a broad range of unfair and deceptive or unconscionable acts and practices. For an
overview of these state laws, see Wentz, State Laws Governing Unfair and Deceptive Trade
Practices, Ch. 4 in CONSUMER PROTECTION REPORTING SERVICE (D. Carroll & D. Rothschild
eds. 1985).
316. See Cooper, supra note 305, at 420.
of monopolization, is a prerequisite to recovery under both the com-
pleted and attempted monopolization offenses of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act."1 7 There is, however, no exact means of determining
when a firm possesses, or is dangerously close to possessing, such
monopoly power. In the context of the completed monopolization of-
fense, for example, the Supreme Court has defined monopoly power
as the power to control prices or exclude competition. 318 The Court
has held that when market share is very large, in excess of approxi-
mately seventy-five percent, monopoly power may be inferred from
market share alone.319 Some lower courts, however, have expanded
the concept of monopoly power, and have indicated that even a fifty
percent market share is not a prerequisite to a finding of monopoly
power.320 These courts generally have relied upon barrier to entry
and other evidence to support the inference of monopoly power when
market share is low. 321 Similarly, in the context of the attempted
monopolization offense, some courts have sought to expand the appli-
cation of Section 2 in vertical cases by adopting an extremely narrow
market definition,3 2 or by eroding the need to prove a dangerous
probability of attaining monopoly power.32 3
Attempts by lower courts to broaden the concept of monopoly
power are unwarranted.3 12 Recent economic studies indicate that the
profits of firms in concentrated industries are largely the result of
efficiencies, not of collusion or shared monopoly.3 25 Barriers to entry
may also largely reflect efficiencies.3 26 To the extent that the primary
aim of the antitrust laws is the promotion of consumer welfare,
32 7
courts should focus not on concentration or entry barrier evidence,
but on market share as the primary indication of monopoly power.
328
Only when a defendant possesses, or is dangerously close to possess-
ing, an overwhelmingly large share of the relevant market ought
Section 2 of the Sherman Act be applied.329
317. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (monopoly power required for monopoli-
zation); supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text (dangerous probability of monopoly power
required in attempt cases).
318. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 47-76 and accompanying text.
322. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
323. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 247-315 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 222-44 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 269-83 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 247-64 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 34-46, 79-85, 284, 306-07 and accompanying text.
329. Id.

